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VIEWS OF ADDICTION AND THE DUTY TO WARN 
Alan Schwartz* 
You will come first of all to the Sirens, who are enchanters of all 
mankind and whoever comes their way; and that man who unsuspect- 
ing approaches them, and listens to the Sirens singing, has no pros- 
pect of coming home and delighting his wife and little children as 
they stand about him in greeting, but the Sirens by the melody of 
their singing enchant him. They sit in their meadow, but the beach 
before it is piled with boneheaps of men now rotted away, and the 
skins shrivel upon them. You must drive straight on past, but melt 
down sweet wax of honey and with it stop your companions' ears, so 
none can listen; the rest, that is, but if you yourself are wanting to 
hear them, then have them tie you hand and foot on the fast ship, 
standing upright against the mast with the ropes' ends lashed around 
it, so that you can have joy in hearing the song of the Sirens; but if 
you supplicate your men and implore them to set you free, then they 
must tie you fast with even more lashings.l 
T HIS Article asks (i) whether tort liability should be imposed on 
the makers of substances that are legal to sell but that may addict 
users, if the makers have not warned users of the risk of addiction, 
and (ii) whether the state should create a standard warning against 
addiction that the makers of possibly addicting substances must give. 
There is little authority on the first question.2 Recently, plaintiffs 
* William K. Townsend Professor of Law, Yale Law School. This Article was improved 
substantially by comments made at a Law and Economics Workshop at the University of 
Chicago and Faculty Workshops at Pennsylvania, Tulane, and Yale Law Schools. Robert A. 
Burt, Jules Coleman, Richard Craswell, Will T. Jones, Michael Levine, Stephen J. Morse, Jeff 
Strnad, and Cass Sunstein also made helpful suggestions. This Article is partly based on a 
report I made as Associate Reporter to the American Law Institute Project: Compensation 
and Liability for Product and Process Injuries. The thoughts expressed here are mine, and 
reflect neither the views of other reporters on the project nor the views of the ALI. 
1 Homer, The Odyssey, bk. XII, 11. 39-54 (R. Lattimore trans. 1967). The speaker is Circe. 2 It was held, in Crocker v. Winthrop Laboratories, 514 S.W.2d 429 (Tex. 1974), that the 
maker of a drug must warn against the drug's propensity to addict some users if the maker 
knows or should have known of this propensity. See also Bikowicz v. Nedco Pharmacy, 130 
A.D.2d 89, 517 N.Y.S.2d 829 (1987) (cause of action against drug manufacturer and medical 
intermediaries upon whom patient relied for failure to warn of the addictive properties of 
Talwin). But see Pysz v. Henry's Drug Store, 457 So. 2d 561 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (where 
prescribing physician knew of amount of drug prescribed over a number of years and patient's 
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have added a cause of action, in their suits against the cigarette com- 
panies, which claims that the companies' warnings always have been 
defective because the warnings do not caution against cigarettes' 
addictive properties. Addiction is a distinct harm on this view 
because consumers may know that long-term smoking can cause dis- 
ease, but not know that the decision to begin smoking necessarily 
entails an irrevocable commitment to smoke long term. No cigarette 
case has been won on this ground,3 but the chance for success was 
improved by the recent Surgeon General's report concluding that 
history of addiction, pharmacist's failure to warn of addictive qualities of drug not failure to 
exercise due care). There seem not to be other cases. It is becoming customary in the mental 
health literature to replace the word "addiction" with the term "dependence." This Article 
uses the more familiar word. 
3 A thorough argument that the cigarette manufacturers hould be held liable for failing to 
warn against addiction is in Garer, Cigarette Dependency and Civil Liability: A Modest 
Proposal, 53 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1423 (1980). There is no legal impediment to the argument as 
applied to pre-1966 sales, but a question exists whether a warning claim for sales made after 
1966 is preempted by the required Federal Warning. The statute explicitly provides that "[n]o 
statement relating to smoking and health, other than the statement required by section 1333 of 
this title, shall be required on any cigarette package." Federal Cigarette Advertising and 
Labeling Act, 15 U.S.C. ? 1334 (1982) (Labeling Act). In subsequent legislation relating to 
smokeless tobacco products, Congress made explicit its intention that "[n]othing in this Act 
shall relieve any person from liability at common law . . . to any other person." 
Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco Health Education Act of 1986, ? 7(c), 15 U.S.C. ? 4406(c) 
(Supp. IV 1986). This suggests a congressional policy in the context of tobacco products 
labeling not to preclude civil liability. See Palmer v. Liggett Group, 633 F. Supp. 1171 (D. 
Mass. 1986). All agree that the Labeling Act prohibits state legislatures and agencies from 
requiring additional warnings. The legislative history suggests that this was Congress' primary 
concern. S. Rep. No. 566, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 12, reprinted in 1970 U.S. Code Cong. & 
Admin. News 2652, 2663. The court in Palmer has held that the statute does not preempt 
common law tort suits based on the inadequacy of the warning. 633 F. Supp. 1171. Two other 
courts have found preemption, one on the ground that the congressional scheme requires 
uniformity of labeling, Roysden v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 623 F. Supp. 1189 (D. Tenn. 
1985), and the other for no discernable reason, Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 789 F.2d 181 (3d 
Cir. 1986). These cases considered warnings against the dangers of cigarettes in general, not 
the danger that cigarettes addict. Congress apparently did not have this danger in mind. 
Thus, the question whether the federal law preempts a common law holding that cigarette 
warnings that fail to mention addiction are defective seems to be open. The Alcoholic 
Beverage Labeling Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, ? 8001, 102 Stat. 4518, 4519, requires 
firms to warn that "[c]onsumption of alcoholic beverages ... may cause health problems" and 
contains a preemption statement similar to that in 15 U.S.C. ? 1334. Again, Congress seemed 
not to consider addiction. 
This Article will not deal with the preemption issue. Many cigarette cases are brought by 
persons who smoked extensively before 1966 and many more alcohol cases could be brought 
by persons who drank before 1988. Thus, the argument here will be relevant to a large number 
of cigarette and alcohol cases, and to many actions that could be brought in connection with 
other products. 
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smoking is addictive, particularly since the report recommends that 
the tobacco companies be required to warn.4 The consequences of a 
plaintiff's victory likely would spread beyond the tobacco industry. 
Alcohol also is said to be addictive, yet the liquor and wine makers do 
not warn against the risk of addiction. Drugs that reduce stress, such 
as valium, sometimes are abused and so may be found addictive; the 
drug makers, however, do not advise consumers of their products' 
possibly addictive properties. The question whether warnings in com- 
mon use are legally infirm because they fail to caution against a prod- 
uct's propensity to addict thus is open and topical. It also is 
important because an affirmative answer could generate products lia- 
bility litigation that would match in magnitude the asbestos and DES 
cases. The question whether the FDA or some other agency should 
create standard warnings for possibly addictive products also is signif- 
icant because many substances can be abused. 
The question of what duties firms should have to warn against the 
addicting properties of their products is clarified when a distinction is 
drawn between what an addiction is and what the cause of an addic- 
tion is. The two central criteria that define an addiction are: (i) 
addicted persons manifest "excessive appetitive behavior"-they con- 
sume drugs, alcohol, or tobacco to the point where consumption 
impairs normal functioning or endangers health; (ii) this excessive 
appetitive behavior is very difficult to discontinue. What this Article 
calls a "view" of addiction is a causal explanation of addictive con- 
duct.5 Three causal views play a role in current discourse. Perhaps 
4 Office of Smoking & Health, U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Services, The Health 
Consequences of Smoking-Nicotine Addiction: A Report of the Surgeon General (1988) 
[hereinafter Nicotine Addiction]. This report obviously would answer "yes" to the question 
whether the state should create standard warnings against addictive products. 5 The text distinguishes the question what is an addiction from the question what is a cause 
of an addiction to avoid begging questions. The two-part definition of an addiction captures 
what is uncontroversially central to addictive behavior-its excessive and compulsive aspect. 
The Article then inquires into the causes of such conduct. As an illustration of the danger to 
be avoided, defining an addiction as excessive appetitive behavior accompanied by substance- 
induced chemical changes in the brain conveys the impression that addictions are caused by 
the consumption of addictive substances rather than caused by "psychological" or other 
factors. Some commentators, however, would claim that the issue is whether substances or 
psychology play the major role. The Surgeon General's report on nicotine addiction seems to 
beg questions in the way sought to be avoided here: it claims that nicotine is addicting on the 
basis of "pharmacological" analyses, but the report explicitly eschews consideration of 
"psychological and social factors" that, the report itself concedes, "also are important 
influences on tobacco use." See Nicotine Addiction, supra note 4, at 6. Thus the authors of 
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the most common is referred to here as the "strong substance caused 
view" (SSCV), which holds that certain substances can addict ordi- 
nary persons. According to the strong substance caused view, some 
substances induce excessive appetitive behavior in ordinary users in 
two related ways: first, consumption is initially pleasurable, but the 
pleasure declines with time so a user ultimately would prefer to stop; 
second, consumption, however, induces physiological changes in users 
such that withdrawal would create severe physical pain or discomfort. 
A user is "hooked" when the negative utility she would derive from 
withdrawal will exceed the negative utility she expects from continu- 
ance. An "addictive substance" is a product that can hook any ordi- 
nary person in this way. The Ulysses legend is metaphor for the 
strong substance caused view of addiction; anyone who hears the 
Sirens' song is lost unless he takes extraordinary precautions. 
The SSCV holds that an addictive substance can hook (almost) 
anyone who consumes a nontrivial amount of it. A second view, 
called here the "biological view" (BV), claims that only persons with 
particular biological predispositions will become hooked; the remain- 
der can consume the substance with impunity. For example, only a 
subset of alcohol users become alcoholics. According to the BV, this 
subset is composed of persons with a genetic predisposition to alco- 
holism. These two views of addiction are similar because they sup- 
pose addiction always to have the same phenomenology-in 
particular, they suppose addiction to be largely involuntary-but dif- 
fer in that the SSCV holds that addicting substances can hook almost 
any ordinary person, while the BV holds that these substances only 
hook people with certain biologies. 
A third view of addiction, referred to here as the "characterological 
view" (CV) has two aspects. Respecting the excessive appetitive 
behavior facet of addiction, the CV holds that addicts consume to 
excess because, given their characters and circumstances, excessive 
consumption reflects the best adaptation they can make to life; exces- 
sive consumption, that is, provides addicts with more utility than any 
other mode of use or abstinence. This view thus claims that the pre- 
disposition of some persons to engage in addictive behavior is more a 
the report cannot distinguish the relative causal contributions to long-term cigarette 
consumption of nicotine-induced biological changes and the "psychological and social 
factors." 
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function of their characters than of their biologies. Respecting the 
hard-to-stop facet of addiction, the CV holds that users continue not 
because consumption is the lesser of two evils, as the other views of 
addiction claim, but because heavy consumption is utility maximiz- 
ing. Another way to put the CV's claim here is that an addictive 
behavior is difficult to discontinue given one's character; hence, the 
best way to stop is to alter one's character. Stopping then actually is 
very difficult because character change is very difficult. 
These three views of addiction imply different legal rules respecting 
warnings. The SSCV implies that makers of addictive products 
should warn that the pleasure use provides will decline over time, but 
physical withdrawal cost will increase so that there is a "great risk" of 
addiction. Circe was right to warn Ulysses because Sirens were bad 
for sailors. The BV implies a similar warning but qualified by the 
word "may"; that is, the warning should say that people with particu- 
lar biologies will become addicted with a high probability. The CV 
does not support a case for warnings, given the conventional under- 
standing of the function that product warnings serve. According to 
the CV, addicts consume as long as consumption yields gains in 
excess of the (often high) costs, so there is no danger to be warned 
against. Another way to put this conclusion is that, on the CV, with- 
drawal cost is not primarily physical, but rather is an opportunity 
cost-the foregone positive benefits that further consumption would 
yield.6 The conventional understanding of product warnings holds 
that persons should be warned against risks. A risk is commonly 
defined as a possible outcome arising from use itself that would 
decrease a person's utility were it to occur. That a person might incur 
an opportunity cost from discontinuing use is not a risk in this sense; 
an opportunity cost could arise from discontinuance only if use itself 
6 Observers who believe that the existence of physical withdrawal costs do not fully explain 
addictive behavior commonly say that addiction has a "psychological" component, or that 
some addictions are "psychological." This sometimes means that to discontinue excessive 
appetitive behavior would cause mental pain. The CV holds that this mental pain is the 
opportunity cost of foregone utility. On this interpretation, to say that an addiction is 
psychological is to adopt the CV. Another interpretation of the claim that addictions are 
psychological is that people with neuroses or other mental disorders are more likely to become 
addicted. This claim is consistent with the CV, which does not claim that addicts typically are 
mentally healthy and happy persons, but only that addictions reflect the best adaptations for 
addicts given who they are. Other interpretations of the claim that addictions are 
psychological seem obscure. 
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yielded net gains. To make this point more concrete, realize that most 
people would answer "no" to the question whether the chocolate 
makers should be made to warn consumers that chocolate is addicting 
because it is so delicious that many users would incur high (opportu- 
nity) costs were they to give it up. 
This Article argues that the evidence best sustains the CV; hence, 
there should be no duty to warn. In particular, the SSCV's focus on 
substances is plausible because some substances are more likely than 
others to be associated with addictions, but the central predictions of 
this theory respecting the nature of addictive behavior are unsup- 
ported by the data. The BV also is plausible as a theory of addiction 
because there is some evidence associating addictions with genetic fac- 
tors. There is, however, no theoretical account of this linkage and the 
evidence also suggests that genetic factors can explain only a small 
amount of addictive behavior. Rather, the CV best accounts for 
much of what is observed about addictions. To be more precise, 
widely held conceptions of what it means to act freely together with 
the evidence imply that addictive behavior is chosen, not compelled. 
This is not altogether to deny the common perception that persons 
experience physical withdrawal costs from discontinuing the use of 
certain substances. These costs sometimes do exist, but apparently 
not at levels above those that most people would call an "irritation."7 
There is a case for state-created standard warnings that discontinu- 
ance can cause such discomfort, on the analogy to currently required 
drug warnings that use can cause irritability or sleeplessness. The 
question whether addiction warnings of this type should be required 
seems an unimportant public policy issue, however. 
Part I below first states the normative case for requiring warnings 
and shows that it is best grounded in the SSCV. This Part then shows 
that the SSCV is likely false. Part II discusses the other views of 
addiction and argues that the CV best fits the evidence. Part III then 
shows what rules respecting warnings each view of addiction implies 
and argues that, given the greater likelihood that the CV is correct, 
there should be no common law liability for failing to warn of the 
7 For example, the chief self-reported physical withdrawal cost from ceasing to smoke is 
irritability, which declines substantially over a period of three to six months. See Clavel, 
Benhamou & Flamant, Nicotine Dependence and Secondary Effects of Smoking Cessation, 10 
J. Behavioral Med. 555, 557 (1987). Similar data respecting physical withdrawal costs are 
cited infra note 18. 
514 [Vol. 75:509 
Views of Addiction 
addicting properties of products and few state-created standard warn- 
ings. The analysis in Part III initially rests on the conventional view 
of the purpose for requiring warnings, that is described above. Part 
III also considers broader theories of the functions that warnings can 
serve, such as the theory that society should require warnings to 
express its disapproval with the use of certain products that it is 
unwilling to ban. The case for requiring addiction warnings by stat- 
ute or regulation is more plausible under these broader theories, but 
ultimately is unpersuasive. 
Before reaching the argument, two clarifying remarks should be 
made. First, that substance abuse is optimal for abusers given their 
characters does not mean that it is optimal for society. Addicts some- 
times create negative externalities; a possible strategy for eliminating 
them is to make illegal the sale of substances whose consumption is 
associated with highly antisocial conduct. This Article does not con- 
sider such prohibitions because its subject is warnings; a discussion 
about what warnings firms should give presupposes a prior political 
decision to allow informed use. The political decisions to permit the 
sale of the products that are discussed below-primarily tobacco and 
alcohol-are not analyzed here. Second, while excessive appetitive 
behavior is optimal for addicts, being an addict generally is not a good 
thing. Addictions often reflect desperate adaptations that are made 
by persons who hold immature or otherwise unfortunate attitudes or 
who are in very difficult circumstances. For example, a person is 
more likely to become addicted to drugs or alcohol, other things 
equal, if she lives in a social setting so deprived that being an addict is 
acceptable (or at least not condemned). Consequently, the state has a 
legitimate role to play in helping addicts to change, in instructing peo- 
ple, especially the young, as to the unfortunate consequences to which 
the possession of particular characters can give rise, and in ameliorat- 
ing social circumstances that are so awful as to make addiction seem 
an optimal response. These state functions are not considered here. 
This is because the product labels on which warnings must appear are 
poor vehicles for engendering character change or conveying moral 
instruction, and this Article inquires into the disclosures that firms 
should be required to make, given the constraint that the disclosures 
must appear on the product's label or in accompanying sale materials. 
Also, no version of Products Liability Law could be constructed that 
would effect the major social changes that might reduce the frequency 
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of addiction in particularly susceptible groups. The price of focusing 
on warning issues thus is the neglect of important questions respecting 
how the state should best respond to addictive behaviors. Warning 
issues are sufficiently significant to justify this constrained focus. 
I. WARNINGS AND THE STANDARD VIEW OF ADDICTION 
A. The Case for Requiring Warnings 
Some products are "unavoidably unsafe," in the sense that any 
good and harm these products do is a necessary function of their 
chemical structure; consequently, the products cannot be made safer 
without also being transmuted into different products. Tobacco, alco- 
hol, and some drugs are unavoidably unsafe.8 The argument that the 
maker of an unavoidably unsafe product should warn of its addictive 
properties has three steps. First, warnings in connection with 
unavoidably unsafe products will inform choice. The notion is that a 
person can be harmed but not wronged by the consequences of actions 
she voluntarily undertakes-risks to which she consents-so the 
maker cannot wrong users when it sells an unavoidably unsafe prod- 
uct accompanied by an appropriate warning. Second, voluntariness is 
not a binary concept but a continuum; some choices are more volun- 
tary than others, for example when made under less financial pressure 
or with more information. Third, conventional notions of autonomy 
imply that the more irrevocable a person's decision is, the greater 
should be the degree of voluntariness required before the state 
respects the person's choice. Joel Feinberg suggests how these prem- 
ises may bear on the warning question: 
Another example of a harmful choice which for all practical purposes 
may be irrevocable is the decision to begin taking an addicting drug. 
If the drug-taker has no idea that the drug is in fact addicting, or if he 
falsely believes that it will not be addicting in his case, then his deci- 
sion falls well below the requisite level of voluntariness.9 
8 Tobacco differs somewhat from the other products listed because the nicotine content of 
cigarettes can be reduced. Whether cigarettes can be modified sufficiently to pose little risk to 
health but still be pleasureable to smoke apparently is not known. RJR Nabisco Inc. recently 
introduced a smokeless cigarette, but then withdrew it from the market. See RJR Nabisco 
Abandons 'Smokeless' Cigarette, Wall St. J., March 1, 1989, B1, col. 3. 
9 J. Feinberg, Harm to Self 120 (1986). Garer accepts the strong substance caused view of 
addiction, and rests his case for requiring warnings on grounds similar to those of Feinberg. 
See Garer, supra note 3, at 1431-34. 
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This analysis suggests that the decision to consume would be volun- 
tary if the "drug taker" had a good "idea" that the drug was 
addicting generally or in his case-if the drug taker were appropri- 
ately warned. 
This case for warnings is best grounded in the SSCV. According to 
it, the decision to begin consumption of an addictive substance is 
irrevocable for many users because physical withdrawal costs will pre- 
clude cessation. Hence, the consumption decision would "fall well 
below the requisite level of voluntariness" unless the maker of an 
addictive substance had issued a clear warning. 
B. Do Addictive Substances Exist? 
This case for requiring warnings supposes that some products have 
properties such that consumption of them by ordinary persons can 
become irrevocable. The difficulty is to identify the products that 
have these properties. Recall that to be addicted to a substance is to 
consume it to excess, not occasionally, but as a matter of routine. 
Many people obviously consume substances in this way. The question 
is whether their behavior is involuntary-caused against their will by 
the properties of a substance itself-or whether people prefer to con- 
sume certain substances to excess because this consumption pattern 
yields them pleasures in excess of pains. According to the strong sub- 
stance caused view of addiction, an "addictive substance" induces 
persons involuntarily to consume to excess. The best recent discus- 
sion of this view, by Cass Sunstein,10 attempts to derive criteria for 
identifying the substances that do this. As is next shown, no known 
substances satisfy these criteria. If substances do not addict, the 
SSCV is false because it claims that addiction is caused by substances. 
Sunstein defines an addictive product as one that a person would 
prefer never to be exposed to were he "armed with perfect informa- 
tion."1' This does not get us far, but Sunstein adds that an addiction 
is "a process in which the subjective costs of not consuming a particu- 
lar good increase dramatically over time, while the subjective benefits 
decrease or remain stable."'2 The notion of stable benefits is inconsis- 
10 Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1129, 1158-61 
(1986). The analysis of Sunstein's view of addiction also applies to his view of habit, which he 
claims is similar to addiction "but it is less intense." Id. at 1161. 
11 Id. at 1159, 1161. 
12 Id. at 1158. 
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tent with Sunstein's thesis, but his argument can dispense with stabil- 
ity. To see the difficulty, realize that a person will not begin 
consumption of a product unless the benefit from initial use exceeds 
its cost, which is primarily the product's price. If the price remains 
relatively stable, which is common, then if the benefit from each unit 
of consumption also remains stable, the user is never involuntarily 
addicted. This is because when marginal consumption benefits always 
exceed consumption costs, the user continues to consume not to avoid 
incurring physical withdrawal costs, but because consumption yields 
positive utility. Sunstein's belief that addictions are involuntary is 
rendered plausible by restating his position to provide that an addic- 
tive product generates physical withdrawal costs that increase with 
time and use benefits that decline strictly monotonically with time. 
After some period, the user of such a product would like to stop 
because consumption cost exceeds subjective benefit, but cannot stop 
because withdrawal cost is too great. One "armed with perfect infor- 
mation"-one who could discount to present value the total costs and 
benefits of consumption over a life-would not voluntarily begin to 
use such a product unless he valued current utility much more highly 
than future gain. Uninformed persons, in contrast, might commence 
consumption and then be trapped. Thus, substances that generate the 
pattern of increasing withdrawal costs and monotonically decreasing 
use benefits are addictive. 
Sunstein's definition is unsatisfactory because it is incomplete and, 
more importantly, because it implies predictions respecting addictive 
behavior that the facts disconfirm. Some notation will help make 
these difficulties clear. Let the cost of each unit of consumption of a 
substance equal the product's price, called k, and suppose that the 
price remains constant over the relevant time period. The product 
generates a unit of benefit B with each use. Consumption of the sub- 
stance is complementary over time, which means that the benefit that 
a user will derive from a unit of consumption today is affected by the 
fact that the user consumed the substance yesterday. Sunstein asserts 
that benefits decline with time, so letting t index time we can write 
B = f(t) where B'< 0.13 Ceasing to consume the substance will cause 
13 B' is the derivative of the benefit function with respect to time. In words, B' is the 
marginal benefit of continuing to consume and is represented as negative because, according to 
Sunstein, the benefits from consumption decline as consumption continues. Id. at 1160. 
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the user to experience physical withdrawal costs W; these are 
assumed to increase with prolonged use, so we can write W = f(t) 
where W' > 0. A necessary condition for beginning to use the product 
is that at t = 0, B>k; the product generates initial benefits that 
exceed its costs. 
Then there are two cases to consider. In both, the user first begins 
to use the substance at time t = 0 and will die at time t = T. The 
rate at which the user discounts future benefits and costs to present 
value is d. At each moment the user has the choice whether to con- 
sume one more unit of the substance or incur the physical withdrawal 
costs entailed in discontinuing consumption. Also, in both cases the 
consumer has used the substance long enough so that the benefit of a 
unit of consumption B has fallen below the cost of consumption k. In 
case one, there exists a time t* such that . d(B - k) > W. That is, a 
user at t* who is then familiar with the substance's attributes will see 
that the net present value of continuing to consume the substance for 
as long as he lives (which is negative because B < k) exceeds the (also 
negative) costs of withdrawal; hence, the user maximizes utility by 
incurring the lower cost of discontinuance. This case can exist if mar- 
ginal use benefits decline faster than withdrawal costs rise.14 The 
case also is consistent with Sunstein's definition, which requires only 
that benefits decline and withdrawal costs rise over time, but the 
products that this case describes cannot be addictive because people 
can stop using these products when they generate benefits that fall 
below their costs. The intuition underlying this result is simple: if the 
pleasure a particular substance provides declines relatively quickly 
while giving the substance up becomes difficult only after a considera- 
ble period of use, the substance cannot addict. Hence, the property of 
a product to generate declining marginal use benefits and increasing 
14 Recall that benefits are assumed to fall and withdrawal costs to increase with time. If the 
former fall more rapidly than the latter rise, it is possible for there to be a time when the 
negative utility of continuing to consume-benefits minus constant consumption costs- 
exceeds the negative utility of withdrawal. Consumption costs also include other people's 
disapproval and the inconvenience, when it exists, of pursuing one's habit. These costs 
probably do not increase significantly with time, so considering them would not contradict the 
representation of consumption costs as a constant. To add these costs would increase k and so 
reduce the likelihood that particular products will addict. If cumulative use of a substance 
endangers health, as smoking cigarettes does, then consumption costs will rise with time. This 
case is considered infra Part III.B. The analysis in this Part holds if a rising consumption cost 
curve is assumed. 
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physical withdrawal costs is a necessary but not sufficient condition 
for addiction. 
The jointly necessary and sufficient conditions for addiction-the 
second relevant case-are (i) B'< 0; W' >0; and (ii) B" < W". Condi- 
tion (ii) provides that the second derivative of the benefit function is 
less than the second derivative of the withdrawal cost function. In 
words, condition (ii) requires marginal use benefits to decline at a 
slower rate than withdrawal costs rise. When this pattern appears, it 
never will be the case that fSd(B - k) > W, so users cannot stop. 
Intuitively, if the substance provides pleasure for a long enough 
period, withdrawal costs will rise sufficiently so that they will exceed 
at every moment in time the (negative) net present value of continuing 
to consume the substance; hence, the user always maximizes utility by 
incurring the lower cost of continuing to consume. To use the com- 
mon phrase, the user is hooked. Therefore, a product cannot be 
addictive unless it generates declining marginal use benefits and 
increasing withdrawal costs-condition (i); and the former fall more 
slowly than the latter rise-condition (ii). Products that satisfy both 
conditions will addict; products that satisfy only the first condition 
will not. 
This formal statement of the SSCV generates three important pre- 
dictions: (i) persons who are addicted cannot voluntarily quit; (ii) 
physical withdrawal costs are necessary to the causation of addictions; 
and (iii) addicts who are cured will seldom relapse. Respecting pre- 
diction (i), realize that physical withdrawal costs play a role in the 
theory that is analogous to an external physical threat. To see why, 
suppose that a person has decided not to drink milk anymore, but an 
evil member of the "milk establishment" threatens to inflict physical 
pain on this person so great that it would exceed her disutility from 
continuing to drink. Then the person will be a milk drinker for as 
long as the threat is credible, but her decision will not be voluntary. 
When the second condition for addiction derived above is met, a per- 
son cannot discontinue use of a substance, despite her desires, because 
cessation would cause physical pain-the withdrawal cost-that 
would exceed her disutility from continuance. This threat of incur- 
ring physical pain is credible forever because physical withdrawal 
costs are supposed to exist in consequence of substance-induced 
changes in the body's chemistry and nervous system. Therefore, a 
person who consumes a substance long enough to be addicted to it 
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will always be addicted to it. Respecting prediction (ii), the theory 
holds that people continue to consume products that generate use 
benefits that decline below consumption costs only because physical 
withdrawal costs preclude cessation. Hence, products that produce 
no physical withdrawal costs cannot addict. Respecting prediction 
(iii), addicts can "detoxify" with the aid of drugs or by enduring with 
medical help the period of physical pain. Such cured addicts are, in 
Sunstein's phrase, "armed with perfect information" about the sub- 
stance that addicted them, but no longer are coerced by the threat of 
incurring physical pain to continue using it. Hence, only addicts with 
unusually high discount rates or unusually short memories will 
relapse to addiction. 
The facts reject these predictions. Respecting the first, people have 
altogether discontinued or substantially moderated their use of alco- 
hol, tobacco, heroin, and other drugs.15 A review paper reports, for 
example, that some thirty million people have quit smoking, with 
ninety-five percent quitting on their own.16 Also, a large number of 
soldiers used heroin in Vietnam, but either discontinued use there or 
upon returning home, again with little apparent difficulty.17 This evi- 
dence suggests that allegedly addictive substances such as tobacco and 
alcohol do not generate physical withdrawal costs that are so high as 
to overcome the will of an ordinary person to discontinue use when 
15 See Peele, A Moral Vision of Addiction: How People's Values Determine Whether They 
Become and Remain Addicts, 17 J. Drug Issues 187, 202-03 (1987). Peele's paper is a major 
literature review that cites 93 references. Similar evidence is found in the extensive review J. 
Orford, Excessive Appetites: A Psychological View of Addictions 271 (1985). Studies also 
show that people who relapse to smoking frequently return to abstinence. See Swan & Denk, 
Dynamic Models for the Maintenance of Smoking Cessation: Event History of Late Relapse, 
10 J. Behavorial Med. 527, 546-48 (1987). 
16 See Office of Smoking and Health, U.S. Dep't of Health, Educ. and Welfare, Smoking 
and Health: A Report of the Surgeon General 32 (1979). The number of cigars sold annually 
is reported to have dropped from four billion in 1980 to 2.8 billion today. N.Y. Times, May 28, 
1988, at A29, col. 1. The recent Surgeon General's report also reports sharply decreased cigar 
consumption. Nicotine Addiction, supra note 4, at 580. Additional evidence that 
discontinuing addictive behavior is common is cited infra, notes 17 and 18. 
17 See S. Peele, The Meaning of Addiction: Compulsive Experience and Its Interpretation 
110-11 (1985). The New York Times recently reported a major study by UCLA researchers 
entitled "Consequences of Adolescent Drug Use: Impact on the Lives of Young Adults." 
According to the Times, the study found that the "vast majority" of teenagers who 
experimented with alcohol and drugs at social settings were able to engage in casual use and 
not develop drug problems. N.Y. Times, July 21, 1988, at Al, col. 2. 
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she comes to believe that the costs of consuming exceed the benefits.18 
Also, if physical withdrawal costs do not preclude stopping, these 
substances may not generate declining marginal use benefits; people 
perhaps engage in long-term consumption because each use produces 
net gains. Respecting the second prediction, recall that an addiction 
consists in excessive appetitive behavior that is difficult to discontinue. 
This definition accurately describes the behavior of compulsive gam- 
blers, yet persons can stop gambling without incurring physical with- 
drawal costs. Hence, the second prediction is disconfirmed also; 
physical withdrawal costs are not necessary to the causation of addic- 
tions. Respecting the third prediction, relapses to drugs, drinking, 
and smoking occur far more frequently than the SSCV predicts. 
Given that the facts disconfirm the three central predictions of the 
SSCV, the view likely is erroneous. 
18 The recent Surgeon General's report on nicotine addiction claims that "[t]he 
pharmacologic and behavioral processes that determine tobacco addiction are similar to those 
that determine addiction to drugs such as heroin and cocaine." Nicotine Addiction, supra 
note 4, at 16. The chief physical withdrawal cost from ceasing to smoke is irritability. See 
Clavel, Benhamou & Flamant, supra note 7, at 557. Persons who discontinue cocaine use also 
suffer irritability as well as depression and sleep disturbance. See Brower, Maddahian, Blow & 
Beresford, A Comparison of Self-Reported Symptoms and DSM-III-R Criteria for Cocaine 
Withdrawal, 14 Am. J. Drug & Alcohol Abuse 347, 351 (1988). The depression symptom, 
however, may result not only from the chemical properties of the drug, but also reflect a 
relapse to a former state; cocaine users often are depressive and apparently use the drug as a 
form of self-medication. See Mirin, Weiss & Michael, Psychopathology in Substance Abusers: 
Diagnosis and Treatment, 14 Am. J. Drug & Alcohol Abuse 139, 152-53 (1988). The apparent 
similarities among tobacco, heroin, and cocaine suggest that the existence of high physical 
withdrawal costs cannot explain continued use of these drugs. Additional evidence also shows 
that physical withdrawal costs from discontinuance of commonly abused substances are low. 
A recent review stated: 
There is extensive evidence and growing recognition that withdrawal symptoms and 
tolerance only sometimes accompany addiction and are rarely its cause.... 
Another strong indication that withdrawal symptoms and addiction are not always 
linked is that profound addictions often occur without withdrawal symptoms. For 
example, many researchers have found that a significant proportion of people who live 
the devastating lives of street junkies do not have withdrawal symptoms when heroin 
supplies are interrupted or when they are pharmacologically deprived by a "naxolene 
challenge." 
In contrast, some drugs that produce withdrawal symptoms are not used 
compulsively.... 
Alexander & Schweighofer, Defining "Addiction," 29 Canadian Psychology 151, 155 (1988) 
(citations omitted). See also, e.g., H. Fingarette & A. Hasse, Mental Disabilities and Criminal 
Responsibility 163-66 (1979). 
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Before leaving this analysis, it will be helpful to anticipate the argu- 
ment below by considering a possible modification of the SSCV. Sup- 
pose that addiction is a joint property of products and particular 
persons: some people are genetically capable of becoming alcoholics, 
and only these people experience the phenomenon of slowly declining 
use benefits and rapidly rising withdrawal costs from consuming alco- 
hol.19 This modification also cannot explain why long-term addicts 
stop. So long as one's genes cause one to experience the defining phe- 
nomenon, one who is once addicted is always addicted. The phenom- 
enon, however, is a part of the folklore of addiction; a person is 
believed to be an addict because she wants to stop using substances 
that no longer provide her with pleasure, but she cannot stop because 
the pain of withdrawal is too great. The inability of this pattern of 
costs and benefits to explain the evidence, even when supplemented 
with genetic theories, suggests that addiction is a function of more 
than products and biology. 
The SSCV, if true, would support a case for requiring an addiction 
warning on the analogy to coercive threats: just as potential milk 
drinkers would want to know how the milk establishment behaves, 
potential users of a substance would want to know of the existence of 
physical withdrawal costs so high as would preclude cessation. 
Because these costs, however, account for little addictive behavior, the 
SSCV cannot ground a duty on the part of firms to warn that use of 
their products will of itself "addict." Part III pursues these legal 
implications in greater detail. Part II next considers other views of 
addiction. 
II. OTHER VIEWS OF ADDICTION 
The SSCV is the only view of addiction to hold that certain sub- 
stances can addict ordinary people involuntarily. This view founders 
on a large amount of evidence. The task then is to individuate addic- 
tions more precisely-to explain why some persons will become 
addicted to a particular substance but others will not. There are two 
candidate views of addiction that attempt this task, the biological 
view-only persons with certain biologies become addicted-and the 
characterological view-only persons with certain characters become 
19 This modification transmutes the SSCV into a version of the BV. 
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addicted. Part II argues that the latter view best explains addictive 
behavior. 
A. The Biological View 
A claim that addictions are a function of biology can take three 
relevant forms. To understand these forms, let X represent a particu- 
lar person's biology and A an addiction to a particular substance. 
Then we have: (i) X (in combination with taking the substance) is 
necessary and sufficient for A-only persons with biology X can 
become addicted to the substance and every such person who uses the 
substance does; (ii) X is necessary for A-only persons with biology X 
can become addicted to the substance, but not everyone who uses it 
does; (iii) X is neither necessary nor sufficient for A, but is predispos- 
ing-members from the set of persons who lack biology X and from 
the set of persons who have it both can become addicted to the sub- 
stance, but those from the set with X will become addicted with a 
higher probability. The evidence concerning the relation between 
biology and addiction relates only to alcohol. It rejects the first two 
claims, but provides some support for the third. This Part argues that 
biological factors seem so weakly predisposing to alcoholism and so 
unlikely to be strongly predisposing to other addictions that the BV 
should be rejected as a basis for public policy. 
It is helpful to begin with the alcohol evidence, of which there are 
three types to consider.20 First, certain biological abnormalities often 
are found in heavy drinkers. These abnormalities, called "markers," 
may play a causal role in alcoholism, but this role has not been traced. 
Also, nonalcoholics can have markers. That some alcoholics lack 
markers is inconsistent with claim (ii), that the markers are necessary 
for alcoholism; that some nonalcoholics have them is inconsistent 
with claim (i), that the markers are sufficient for alcoholism. Conse- 
quently, the markers can only be a predisposing cause. The relevant 
question is, by how much does having markers increase the 
probability that a drinker will become addicted? There now seems no 
answer. Second, alcoholics metabolize alcohol differently than 
20 Much of the data in this paragraph derives from Fingarette, Alcoholism: The Mythical 
Disease, 91 Pub. Interest 3 (1988) and the review by Marlatt & Baer, Addictive Behaviors: 
Etiology and Treatment, 39 Ann. Rev. Psychology 223, 227-28 (1988). See also H. Fingarette, 
Heavy Drinking 48-56 (1988). 
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nonalcoholics do. It is unclear whether this difference is a cause or an 
effect of heavy drinking. 
Third, a study of male children that had at least one alcoholic bio- 
logical parent and that were put up for adoption shortly after birth 
claimed to show that eighteen percent of the children became alco- 
holic while five percent of men generally become alcoholic.21 This 
suggests a genetic component to alcoholism. Because eighty-two per- 
cent of the male children of alcoholics do not become alcoholic and 
men with nonalcoholic parents do become alcoholic, the genetic com- 
ponent also is a predisposing cause only. This study, however, is 
methodologically suspect. For example, the increased risk of alcohol- 
ism among the children of alcoholics was found only among those 
who had been diagnosed as "alcoholic"; no genetic loading was found 
among persons whose behavior fell into the categories of "heavy 
drinking" and "problem drinking." When these two categories are 
combined with the category of "alcoholic," the genetic contribution 
to alcoholism disappears. Since the likelihood of being diagnosed as 
an alcoholic correlates positively with engaging in behavior that falls 
into the latter two categories, the genetic explanation of alcoholism 
apparently needs further development.22 Later adoption studies 
claiming to find a genetic cause of alcoholism seem similarly flawed.23 
If, nevertheless, there is a genetic component to alcoholism, then the 
question again is the amount by which genetics increase the 
probability that a drinker will become addicted. The adoption studies 
suggest that one is three or so times more likely to be an alcoholic in 
consequence of genetic factors, but this figure is less dramatic than it 
seems. The flaws in the studies from which the figure is derived 
impeach its seriousness. Also, since approximately four out of five 
persons with the genetic predisposition do not become addicted, 
21 Goodwin, Schulsinger, Hermansen, Copenhagen, Guze & Winokur, Alcohol Problems in 
Adoptees Raised Apart from Alcoholic Biological Parents, 28 Archives Gen. Psychiatry 238, 
240 (1973). 
22 See Searles, The Role of Genetics in the Pathogenesis of Alcoholism, 97 J. Abnormal 
Psychology 153, 158 (1988). This paper is a major review of the genetic/alcoholism literature, 
citing 84 references. The author found little methodologically sound support for the claim that 
alcoholism has a strong genetic component. For example, he says of several Swedish studies 
that also claimed to find a high heritability for alcoholism: "It is remarkable that the results of 
these studies have been accepted with virtually no critical examination." Id. at 159. 
23 See id. at 161. 
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something important other than biology is going on.24 Biological fac- 
tors apparently have not been associated with other addictions. 
This analysis raises two questions. First, what percentage of 
addicts were predisposed to this state by their biologies? Second, as 
just asked, among the addicts whose biology played a role, was biol- 
ogy actually a strongly predisposing cause? Current data seem insuf- 
ficent to answer either question directly. This paper therefore pursues 
another strategy, to consider "indirect" evidence. One type of such 
evidence was cited above, respecting how many addicts are able to 
stop. This data does not impeach the biological view but clouds it. 
That so many people discontinue addictive behavior suggests that the 
ability to "conquer one's genes" is a common trait. This commonality 
in turn implies that biology does not strongly predispose a person to 
addiction. The second type of indirect evidence concerns other expla- 
nations for addictive behavior. If the data more strongly supports 
these explanations than it does the biological explanantion, this sug- 
gests that biology does not significantly increase the likelihood of 
addictive behavior. 
To begin, cultural and social class explanations of addiction are 
plausible. Alcoholism is much more prevalent among Irish, Native 
American, and Black people, those of low social and economic status 
(SES), and men than it is among Asian Americans, Jews, medium and 
high SES persons, and women.25 Also, low SES people are more 
24 A recent review paper, after discussing the idea of a genetic predisposition to alcoholism, 
stated: 
[B]oth the nature of the physical and social environment and socialization experiences 
play a critical role in either exacerbating the risk or in protecting the vulnerable person 
from an adverse outcome. This relation between the person and the environment is 
both dynamic and reciprocal. 
... [P]ersonality can increase the risk for an alcohol or substance-abuse problem. 
Tarter, Are There Inherited Behavioral Traits that Predispose to Substance Abuse?, 56 J. 
Consulting & Clinical Psychology 189, 193 (1988). 
25 The extensive evidence linking addiction and group differences is reviewed in Peele, supra 
note 15, at 189-94. There seems to have been substantial recent study of alcoholism among 
blacks. For a bibliography, see Watts & Wright, Black Alcoholism, 33 J. Alcohol & Drug 
Educ. 76 (1988). Also, George Vaillant and a collaborator recently presented evidence of a 
major longitudinal study of inner city English children of alcoholics (COA's). Forty-two 
percent of these children suffered in later life from alcohol abuse or dependence, as measured 
by DSM-III criteria, while 28% of an inner city control group developed these pathologies. 
The authors explained: 
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likely than high SES people to smoke.26 This evidence suggests that 
cultural and peer pressures more strongly predispose persons to 
addictive behavior than do biological factors. 
Another difficulty with the biological view is that addictive behav- 
iors cluster. For example, apparently ninety percent of alcoholics 
smoke.27 Also, people who use one type of drug are very likely to use 
others; the full set of drugs such users ingest often is pharmacologi- 
cally diverse, ranging from heroin to amphetamines and barbitu- 
The COA's who developed alcohol dependence themselves had more alcoholism in 
their families and were raised in low SES families and in ethnic subcultures that at that 
time failed to help adolescents learn moderate drinking habits and failed to proscribe 
adult drunkenness. . . . [W]e are assuming that cultural background and SES were 
associated with familial attitudes toward drinking and intoxication. Passing on family 
attitudes towards alcohol may be one of the ways in which psychosocial factors modify 
the genetically influenced transmission of alcoholism. 
Drake & Vaillant, Predicting Alcoholism and Personality Disorder in a 33-year Longitudinal 
Study of Children of Alcoholics, 83 Brit. J. Addiction 799, 805 (1988) (citation omitted). 
26 The American middle and upper classes to a considerable extent have substituted the 
consumption of health for the consumption of tobacco. The New York Times reports the 
observation of a lay but interested observer: "'It's become unfashionable to do unhealthy 
things,' lamented Arthur Zartetsky, the owner of Famous Cigars at 55 West 39th Street, who 
complains that even marijuana seems more tolerated [than cigars]." N.Y. Times, May 28, 
1988, at A29, col. 1. For more academic views, see Lau, Hartman & Ware, Health as a Value: 
Methodological and Theoretical Considerations, 5 Health Psychology 25 (1986); Marsh, 
Smoking: Habit or Choice, 37 Population Trends 14 (1984). The recent Surgeon General's 
report on nicotine addiction stated that in the United States in 1985, 35.4% of persons without 
a high school diploma smoked regularly while 16.5% of persons with postgraduate education 
smoked regularly. Nicotine Addiction, supra note 4, at 16. 
27 See Istvan & Matarazzo, Tobacco, Alcohol, and Caffeine Use: A Review of Their 
Interrelationships, 95 Psychological Bull. 301, 312-313 (1984). See also Forney, Forney, 
Fisher, Richards, Scherger, Rixey & Smith, Sociological Correlates of Substance Use Among 
Medical Students, 18 J. Drug Educ. 97, 99 (1988) [hereinafter Sociological Correlates] (Study 
found drug use "to be positively correlated with alcohol consumption and/or tobacco use."); 
Hansen, Graham, Sobel, Shelton, Flag & Johnson, The Consistency of Peer and Parent 
Influences on Tobacco, Alcohol, and Marijuana Use Among Young Adolescents, 10 J. 
Behavioral Med. 559, 575-76 (1987) ("[I]n many respects, tobacco, alcohol, and marijuana 
may be treated as equal contributors to a single drug use construct .... [T]he social 
psychological processes underlying the use of substances by youth have essentially the same 
characteristics .... [A] unitary concept of drug use among young adolescents is a viable 
one."); Marlatt & Baer, supra note 20, at 225-26 ("[B]ecause of notions of biological/genetic 
specificity, disease models of addiction fail to account for commonalities among addictions, 
including addictions that do not involve substance use (e.g., compulsive gambling or sexual 
behavior)."); Newcomb, Fahy & Skagner, Correlates of Cocaine Use Among Adolescents, 18 
J. Drug Issues 327 (1988) (same results as in Sociological Correlates). 
Virginia Law Review 
rates.28 Further, there is a generally positive correlation among the 
use of caffeine, tobacco, and alcohol. No biological model provides a 
plausible explanation of correlated use patterns. Specifically, these 
models seem unable to answer such questions as why, if one is geneti- 
cally predisposed to drink, is one also genetically predisposed to 
smoke? 
Finally, theories that focus on the contribution of personality fac- 
tors to addictive behavior seem plausible. These theories help to 
explain the data respecting the correlated use of allegedly addictive 
substances. For example, if a person's personality predisposes her to 
consume to excess, it is improbable that she will consume only one 
thing in this way. Also suggesting that personality factors play a non- 
trivial causal role respecting addictive behavior, correlations among 
the behaviors of substance abusers extend beyond linked use. As an 
illustration, smokers are less likely to wear seat belts than nonsmokers 
and have higher accident rates.29 There is more direct evidence for 
the role of personality. The probability that a person will be a sub- 
stance abuser correlates negatively with a strong sense of self-esteem, 
a desire to be in control rather than to take risks or seek thrills, being 
achievement-oriented, and being conformist respecting conventional 
moral norms.30 Studies thus show that alcoholics and other addicts 
28 See, e.g., Clayton, Cocaine Use in the United States: In a Blizzard or Just Being Snowed?, 
in Cocaine Use in America: Epidemiological and Clinical Perspectives (N. Kozel & E. Adams 
eds. 1985). 
29 See McGuire, Smoking, Driver Education and Other Correlates of Accidents Among 
Young Males, 4 J. Safety Res. 5 (1972) (accidents); Mechanic, The Stability of Health and 
Illness Behavior: Results from a 16-Year Follow-Up, 69 Am. J. Pub. Health 1142 (1979) 
(seatbelts);. There also is a correlation between gambling and substance abuse. See Lesieur & 
Heineman, Pathological Gambling Among Youthful Multiple Substance Abusers in a 
Therapeutic Community, 83 Brit. J. Addiction 765, 769 (1988) ("The research reported here 
shows a clear connection between pathological gambling and substance abuse in two linked 
therapeutic communities."). 
30 Much of this evidence is reviewed in J. Orford, supra note 15, at 110-25. See also Sutker 
& Allain, Issues in Personality Conceptualizations of Addictive Behaviors, 56 J. Consulting & 
Clinical Psychology 172, 180 (1988) ("Among the commonalities of addicted individuals is 
their penchant to choose with passion and sometimes with reckless abandon forms of 
satisfaction, escape, or change that are disapproved in American society and are associated 
with unfavorable consequences.") Id. at 180. 
The view that addicts tend to be reckless or thrill seeking is supported by other researchers. 
See, e.g., Sociological Correlates, supra note 27, at 104-05: 
Illicit drug, alcohol, and tobacco use are significantly interrelated. Forty-two percent 
of the current drug users in this study were also classified as heavy drinkers. Those 
involved in sensation-seeking sports and activities were more likely to be heavy 
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have notably higher detection rates in psychological tests for antiso- 
cial impulsiveness or aggressiveness; in particular, they are more 
likely than the norm to indicate aggressiveness, assertiveness, pleasure 
seeking, sociopathy, and defiance of authority.31 Also, some studies 
show that the manifestation of behaviors synonymous with antisocial 
behavior in youth predicts later alcoholism.32 These data suggest that 
drinkers. Overall, a pattern emerges that high-risk behaviors are correlated; a student 
will tend to be involved in more than one form of high-risk behavior. 
See also, Craig, Psychological Functioning of Cocaine Free-Basers Derived from Objective 
Psychological Tests, 44 J. Clinical Psychology 599, 602 (1988) ("[T]he cocaine addict is char- 
acterized by acting-out traits, rebelliousness, has problems modulating anger, and shows mod- 
erate levels of depression and hyperactivity."); Johnson, Personality Correlates of Heavy and 
Light Drinking Female College Students, 34 J. Alcohol & Drug Educ. 33, 34-35 (1988) 
("Heavy drinkers manifested a greater fear of failure than did light/moderate drinkers... 
The heavy drinkers were also significantly higher in sensation seeking ...."). 
31 See, e.g., Graham & Strenger, MMPI Characteristics of Alcoholics: A Review, 56 J. 
Consulting & Clinical Psychology 197 (1988). Similar personality differences apparently help 
to account for variations in smoking behavior. See Swan, Carmelli & Rosenman, 
Psychological Characteristics in Twins Discordant for Smoking Behavior: A Matched-Twin- 
Pair Analysis, 13 Addictive Behaviors 51 (1988); see also Cox & Klinger, A Motivational 
Model of Alcoholic Use, 97 J. Abnormal Psychology 168, 173 (1988) ("[C]ertain personality 
characteristics have been frequently observed among people who develop problems with 
alcohol. Characteristics uch as nonconformity, impulsivity, and reward seeking are often seen 
both before the problems with alcohol develop and among alcoholics undergoing treatment."); 
Farrow, Personality Factors Associated with Driving While Intoxicated: A Comparison Study 
of Adolescent Drivers, 34 J. Alcohol & Drug Educ. 21, 26 (1988) ("It would appear that DWI 
[driving while intoxicated] offenders and other adolescent offenders who drink engage in or 
endorse angry, hostile attitudes and behaviors distinct from those young drivers without DWI 
or other legal difficulty."). A recent literature review also found: "The results supported the 
hypothesized positive association between: alcoholism and drug abuse; alcoholism and 
antisocial personality disorder; and antisocial personality disorder and drug abuse." Schubert, 
Wolf, Patterson, Grande & Pendleton, A Statistical Evaluation of the Literature Regarding the 
Associations Among Alcoholism, Drug Abuse, and Antisocial Personality Disorder, 23 Int'l J. 
Addictions 797, 801 (1988). Finally, in several studies of opium addicts the most commonly 
diagnosed personality disorder was "antisocial." See Craig, A Psychometric Study of the 
Prevalence of DSM-III Personality Disorders Among Treated Opiate Addicts, 23 Int'l J. 
Addictions 115, 120 (1988). The modal antisocial prevalence rate in these studies was 33%. 
Id. at 121. Drug addicts, however, often have multiple personality disorders. See, e.g., id. at 
118-19. 
32 See Nathan, The Addictive Personality Is the Behavior of the Addict, 56 J. Consulting & 
Clinical Psychology 183, 184-85 (1988). Antisocial behavior in youth and negative attitudes 
may predict a wide variety of excessive appetitive behaviors. See Clayton, supra note 28; 
Czechowicz, Adolescent Alcohol and Drug Abuse and Its Consequences-An Overview, 14 
Am. J. Drug & Alcohol Abuse 189, 195 (1988) ("the evidence of a positive relationship 
between childhood antisocial behavior and subsequent drug abuse is relatively consistent."). 
The claim in the text is not that a particular "addictive personality" exists and is revealed by 
standard psychological tests; rather, the point is that positive correlations between certain 
personality traits and addictive behavior are inconsistent with the view that genetic factors 
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addictive conduct is part of a pattern of nonconforming behaviors. 
In light of this evidence, the biological view seems implausible 
unless the propensity to engage in nonconforming behaviors itself has 
a biological-that is, inheritable-basis. There seems little evidence, 
however, that the personality traits that correlate positively with 
addiction are inheritable. Also, the conclusion that biological factors 
at most predispose persons to addiction would be unaffected by a 
showing that these personality traits are inheritable. This is because 
the behavior that evidences the traits is not always associated with 
addiction.33 
To summarize, the biological view holds that biological factors 
strongly predispose persons to become addicts. Biology is said to play 
this causal role because addicts differ physically from other persons or 
because the personality factors that contribute to addiction are inher- 
itable. The view is implausible in either statement. There is little evi- 
dence that supports the idea that people are addicts primarily because 
they are physically different, nor is the notion of inheritable character 
traits well established.34 In addition, the plausibility of cultural expla- 
nations, the pattern of linked substance abuse behavior, and the con- 
tribution of personality traits, as manifested in responses to tests or as 
precipitated into observed behavior, all suggest that biology is at best 
a minor cause of addictions.35 
strongly predispose persons to addiction, unless the personality traits themselves are 
inheritable. 
33 Nathan, supra note 32, at 187. 
34 Two leading authorities on addiction recently stated: 
To date, however, the underlying biomedical mechanism of addiction has yet to be 
found, despite decades of diligent searching. New hope that the discovery is near is 
garnered by the use of sophisticated high-tech instrumentation and advanced 
technology .... Modem technology may permit us to shine a brighter light into the 
body's physiological processes, but there is no guarantee that this will illuminate a 
biological key to addiction. 
Marlatt & Fromme, Metaphors for Addiction, in Visions of Addiction: Major Contemporary 
Perspectives on Addiction and Alcoholism 1, 6 (S. Peele ed. 1988) (citation omitted). 
35 A recent analysis of addiction that may account for both excessive appetitive behavior 
and its cessation is in Becker & Murphy, A Theory of Rational Addiction, 96 J. Pol. Econ. 675 
(1988). This theory differs from the SSCV and the BV because, though it stresses the role of 
substances, it holds that people's personal characteristics-their time preference and age, for 
example-also determine whether they will become addicted. Becker and Murphy's main 
claim is that a necessary condition for a substance to addict is that "past consumption of the 
good raises the marginal utility of present consumption." Id. at 681. This view helps to 
account for stopping, for example, because factors exogenous to the product can influence the 
effect of consumption over time, and so the product itself is not necessarily enslaving. The 
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B. The Characterological View 
The characterological view holds that some people choose to 
engage in excessive appetitive behavior because, given their characters 
and circumstances, substance abuse is an aspect of the best adaptation 
they can make to life. That addictive behavior is optimal given one's 
character implies that it is best viewed as voluntary. When a person 
acts in character, he is commonly considered to be acting freely. This 
common perception is held because people are partly responsible for 
their characters: one's character is in considerable part a function of 
one's desire to be a certain sort of person; also, one's character is 
partly constituted by her habits, which are built up from numerous 
discrete choices that, with repetition, harden into behavioral predispo- 
sitions.36 It is character, on this view, that causes people to begin, to 
continue, and in many cases to cease engaging in excessive appetitive 
behavior. The CV seems best to explain the evidence respecting 
addictions. 
Before reviewing this evidence, it will be clarifying to consider what 
it means to choose of one's own free will. Discussions of free will 
often draw distinctions among the kinds of desires a person has. An 
theory, however, should confront two apparent difficulties. First, it "requires" that "strong 
addictions" end with a cold turkey quit, apparently because with a strong addiction the 
complementarity between present and future consumption is so great that only a little present 
consumption will much increase the utility of future consumption; consequently, an addict 
who tries only to moderate her behavior will inevitably spiral up into heavy use. Rather, the 
addict must quit cold turkey because, when present consumption ends, the marginal utility of 
future consumption necessarily falls to zero. The difficulty is that, as the citations above show, 
many people regarded as addicts do not stop altogether, but become moderate users. Becker 
and Murphy need a more precise definition of a "strong addiction" to account for this data. 
Second, just how past consumption increases the utility of present consumption is unclear in 
their theory. Becker and Murphy refer to a learning-by-doing effect, but this effect would seem 
to dissipate quickly; it doesn't take long to master smoking. Apart from learning by doing, the 
obvious link between past and present consumption is that one contemplating use today will 
remember past pleasures, but such memories seemingly can only cause present consumption, 
not affect its utility. Becker and Murphy's theory should show just how consuming yesterday 
influences the marginal utility of consuming today. 
36 Another way to put the claim in text is that a free choice is "in character, in the sense of 
choice that is a result of character traits which the agent affirms or accepts." See Brock, 
Paternalism and Autonomy, 98 Ethics 550, 563 (1988). The assertion that people choose their 
characters should be taken to hold in only a rough sense. This is because the assertion raises a 
regress problem: strictly speaking, one cannot choose a character trait without already 
possessing character traits with which to make the choice; but then the question is where these 
"preexisting" traits came from. The text thus asserts that persons choose their characters in 
the ordinary sense that people often come to possess, more or less, the characters they desire. 
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effective first-order desire is a desire that actually moves a person to 
act. A "second-order volition" is a desire to have a particular set of 
effective first-order desires-a desire to want actually to do certain 
things for particular reasons when the time for action arises. In con- 
trast to first-order desires, second-order volitions commonly derive 
from a person's conception of what is a worthwhile life to lead.37 A 
person exercises free will when he acts on first-order desires that are 
implied by his second-order volitions. Conversely, a person cannot 
act freely if he is powerless to implement his second-order volitions as 
effective first-order desires. This way of understanding what it means 
to act freely leads to a difficulty.38 
Respecting this difficulty, suppose that a person says she wants to 
do action x in order to achieve goal A; then her second-order volition 
apparently is to have an effective first-order desire to do x at the rele- 
vant time. At this time, however, the person is observed to do action 
y, which is not implied by goal A. There are two ways to explain this 
discontinuity between words and actions. First, this person's effective 
first-order desire was to realize the consequences of doing y. Because 
37 The most influential version of this type of theory of free will is in Frankfurt, Freedom of 
the Will and the Concept of a Person, 68 J. Phil. 5 (1971) and Locke & Frankfurt, Three 
Concepts of Free Action: II, 1975 Aristotelian Soc'y Systematic Study for Phil. Proc. 113 
(Supp. vol. 49). The terminology in the text is Frankfurt's. For a recent review and criticism 
of this genre of free will theory, see Watson, Free Action and Free Will, 96 Mind 145 (1987). 
Watson notes that a person's second-order volitions sometimes may not derive from the 
person's notion of the good, but rather from what he thinks would be "fun, or thrilling." Id. at 
150. Watson believes that this fact may make the notion of self-determination problematic, 
apparently because he believes that a person is not acting freely if he acts on a desire to have 
fun. Id. at 150. It is unclear why he thinks this. 
38 The free will literature, as will appear, does not discuss directly the difficulty that is set 
out next, but focuses on two others. First, the theory in the text is hierarchical, referring to an 
ascending set of desires. But then there is no reason to stop at two; a person could want to 
want to want to do something. Must acting freely entail a harmony among all possible levels 
of desire or only between second-order volitions and effective first-order desires? There seems 
no fully satisfactory answer to this question (Frankfurt himself takes the latter position). 
Frankfurt, supra note 37 , at 13. Second, this theory of free will has a difficulty with common 
intuitions about coercion. For example, a person could have an effective first-order desire to 
hand the money over to the armed mugger. This desire could be implied by a second-order 
volition to want to take the life-preserving action should one ever have a choice, yet most 
people would say that the victim was not acting freely in handing over the money but was 
coerced. Michael Slote argues that the victim in fact is not acting freely because he also had 
second-order volitions to resist unjust exactions and to protect his property; these volitions the 
mugger overbore. See Slote, Understanding Free Will, 77 J. Phil. 136, passim (1980). That 
hierarchical theories of free will are subject to the first difficulty and may be partly subject to 
the second does not affect the essence of the argument to be made next. 
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she wanted to do y at the relevant time, she could not have possessed 
a second-order volition to want to do x; had she had that volition, she 
actually would have done x when the time arose. This person's true 
second-order volition therefore was to want to want to do y, perhaps 
in the service of goal B. A second possible interpretation of the per- 
son's behavior is that the person did have a second-order volition to 
do x, but was powerless to act on it; when the time for action arose, 
she could not help wanting to do y, though at other moments she 
truly wants to want to do x. The difficulty is to choose between these 
possible interpretations of the person's behavior.39 
The free will literature speaks to this difficulty obliquely. The 
authors in it give examples of what unfree actions would be, and these 
examples commonly involve external causes. A person is powerless to 
implement her second-order volitions-she is unable effectively to 
want to do x when the time for action arises- because another person 
is manipulating her mind, often with the aid of electrodes magically 
implanted in her brain, to choose against her volitions;40 or she has 
been somehow conditioned not to want what her volitions tell her to 
want when she must act;41 or she is enslaved by addictive substances 
and so has an effective first-order desire to take drugs though her sec- 
ond-order volition is to refuse.42 If these examples exemplify 
unfreedom, then if a person is observed to act repeatedly in a fashion 
that is inconsistent with her expressed volitions, and if no external 
cause explaining this discontinuity exists, the person should be taken 
to be acting freely; she just has different second-order volitions than 
the volitions she expresses. Thus, one who claims to want to lead a 
life in which charity and helping others play major roles, but who 
never gives to charity and performs no public service, is considered 
hypocritical, not unfree. 
39 Gary Watson sought to avoid the first difficulty with hierarchical theories remarked upon 
in note 38, supra, that there may be many possible levels of desire. According to Watson, to 
act freely is just to have consistency between one's motivational and valuational systems-to 
act in accordance with one's values. See Watson, Free Agency, 72 J. Phil. 205, 215 (1975). 
One who holds to such a theory also faces the difficulty of explaining discontinuities between 
observed actions and professed goals. 
40 See, e.g. D. Dennett, Elbow Room 8, 132 (1984); Fischer, Introduction: Responsibility 
and Freedom in Moral Responsibility 9, 9 (J. Fischer ed. 1986). 
41 See Greenspan, Behavior Control and Freedom of Action, 87 Phil. Rev. 225, 226-34 
(1978). 
42 This is Frankfurt's tandard illustration but many others use it. Frankfurt, supra note 37, 
at 12-13. 
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As just said, a substance could play the role of an external cause if 
the SSCV or the BV contained plausible causal accounts of the forma- 
tion of addictions. These views do imply the possibility that a person 
could have a second-order volition to want to want not to smoke, but 
also have an effective first-order desire to smoke because of the "coer- 
cion" that physical withdrawal costs create. The implausibility of 
these views of addiction suggests, to the contrary, that a smoker who 
professes a desire to stop smoking actually does not have this desire 
among his second-order volitions. Rather, this person chooses to 
smoke of his own free will, his professed desire to stop expressing not 
a volition to stop, but rather the sincere wish that he were able to 
implement his true second-order volitions at a lower cost. The 
characterological view initially rests on this analysis; for it is prima 
facie plausible to suppose that addicts consume freely when they 
encounter no external factors that would overbear the will of a nor- 
mal person. The plausibility of the CV is further enhanced by its abil- 
ity to support more believable explanations of the actions of 
beginning, continuing, and ceasing to abuse substances. 
Before assessing these explanations, a clarifying remark should be 
made about the role of circumstance. Holding character constant, 
persons are more likely to become addicted in some social situations 
than in others; the "setting" is a causal factor.43 The CV apparently 
neglects setting in its emphasis on the choosing individual and in its 
claim that addictions are best for addicts. One may respond to the 
CV, that persons cannot always choose their social situations, and 
that what plainly would be best for some addicts would be never to 
have been in a social setting that conduced to addiction. This 
response is true but beside the point to be made here. For the CV 
holds only that an addiction is best for a person given her character 
and the circumstances in which life places her; nothing in the view is 
meant to imply that addicts are living an ideally good life for a person 
43 See N. Zinberg, Drug Set and Setting 77-84 (1986) (finding "a high degree of association 
between opiate use and setting variables"); Mehrabian & O'Reilly, Personality Correlates of 
Habitual Alcohol Use, 23 Int'l J. Addictions 175, 180 (1988) ("The present findings, and the 
related findings reviewed here, consistently indicated that settings that are conducive to 
boredom and loneliness (or a bored temperament condition) result in exceedingly high levels of 
alcohol consumption."). The evidence respecting the correlation between addiction and 
membership in certain cultural or social groups also evidences the role of setting. 
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or that addicts are responsible in the fullest extension of that term for 
their current situations. 
We turn next to how the CV explains addictive behavior. As 
regards beginning to consume excessively, a person who prefers to 
engage in antisocial behavior, or who is unafraid to engage in it, will 
likely try a variety of substances whose use society condemns. Simi- 
larly, a young person who believes he will do poorly in life may be 
undeterred from trying substances that are said to be pleasurable but 
also harmful because their use will impair his future chances. A per- 
son belonging to a cultural group that praises moderate, and does not 
strongly blame excessive, consumption of a substance is more likely 
than members of other groups to try substances that likely yield plea- 
sure but sometimes are abused. The factors that cause all of these 
persons to begin also help explain continuance by those who find sat- 
isfaction in heavy use.44 
44 The CV is similar to the "adaptive model" of addiction recently expounded by 
Alexander. See Alexander, The Disease and Adaptive Models of Addiction: A Framework 
Evaluation, in Visions of Addiction: Major Contemporary Perspectives on Addiction and 
Alcoholism, 45 (S. Peele ed. 1988). Alexander explains his model by referring to the 
predisposing cultural and personality factors associated with addiction that are summarized 
above. He then says: 
These problems, and the way that the person understands them, result in failure to 
achieve the levels of self-reliance, competence, social acceptance, self-confidence and so 
on that are the basic expectations of society. In short, some people fail to "grow up" or 
to maintain adult integration. 
Failure to reach or maintain adult integration... creates an urgent need to search out 
and choose substitute ways to provide meaning, organization, and social 
support.... 
From an adaptive viewpoint, drug addiction or any other "substitute adaptions" are 
adaptive because the alternatives are worse.... In desperate situations, it is adaptive to 
choose the lesser evil. 
Id. at 47 (footnote omitted). A similar model of addiction was suggested by Cox & Klinger: 
[I]f a person does not have satisfying positive incentives to pursue or is not making 
satisfactory progress toward reaching goals that will produce positive incentives, weight 
will be added to that person's expectations that he or she can better enhance positive 
affect by drinking. Insofar as a person's life is burdened by noxious elements or he or 
she is making unsatisfactory progress toward removing these elements, weight will be 
added to that person's expectations that he or she can better counteract negative affect 
by drinking. 
Prior research indicates, in fact, that drinkers act as if they choose alcohol to obtain 
particular emotional effects that they are unable to obtain through nonchemical incen- 
tives. They drink, for example, to feel more powerful, more womanly, more optimistic, 
and less anxious and depressed. 
See Cox & Klinger, supra note 31, at 174 (citations omitted). In a more succinct vein, Becker 
& Murphy argue that although addicts may be unhappy, "they would be even more unhappy if 
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The theory of "stimulus generalization"45 further illuminates con- 
sumption to excess. Under this theory, people commonly associate 
particular substances favorably with certain real world states or 
events: a beer feels great after playing a softball game, for example, so 
one chooses to drink beer after games. Stimulus generalization occurs 
when persons associate the substance favorably with several states or 
events: smoking is perceived to be pleasurable after a meal, when try- 
ing to concentrate on a difficult task, and then also when coping with 
a stressful morning, so one chooses to smoke on all these occasions. 
Persons may become addicted when they associate the pleasure that 
particular substances yield with so many real world states and events 
over a sufficiently long period that consumption becomes automatic 
and generalized; one does not consciously consider whether to smoke 
the next cigarette, but instead is a smoker. The stimulus generaliza- 
tion theory does not itself explain why some people generalize 
pleasures while others do not, but it is helpful in understanding 
aspects of the phenomenology of addiction. In addition to the analy- 
sis of the commencement of addictions just given, the theory helps 
explain why addictive behavior is more frequently associated with 
some substances than with others. Certain products, such as alcohol 
and cigarettes, are capable of providing pleasure and satisfaction in 
more settings than are other products, such as spinach and bran; 
products in the former category are more likely to be consumed exces- 
sively and will be more difficult to give up than products in the latter 
category. 
The characterological view also helps explain how and why people 
moderate excessive appetitive behavior or cease engaging in particular 
behaviors altogether. The stimulus generalization theory guides ther- 
apies that seek to break the link users make between real world states 
and desired psychological states. Excessive eaters, for example, are 
encouraged to eat only at mealtimes. People are motivated to engage 
in forms of therapy or directly to alter excessive behaviors because 
they want to change their lives. Many men who drink heavily when 
young "mature out" of alcoholism, often voluntarily, because being 
an alcoholic is perceived to be inconsistent with job and family 
they were prevented from consuming the addictive goods." Becker & Murphy, supra note 35, 
at 691. 
45 See Orford, supra note 15, at 190-92 for a review. Fingarette develops a similar 
explanation. See Heavy Drinking, supra note 20, at 99-111 (heavy drinking is "a way of life"). 
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responsibilities.46 Smokers commonly explain stopping as the product 
of a decision to change or get control over their lives.47 An important 
aspect of the phenomenology of addiction also is best explained by 
regarding cessation as a product of voluntary choice; therapy is effica- 
cious but not differentially so. All alcohol therapies do equally well, 
for example, and none do better than an alcoholic's hour or two with 
a valued counsellor such as a priest.48 The similarity in results among 
different therapies and the success that many people experience with- 
46 A recent review stated: "The few long-term prospective studies that exist indicate that 
most adolescents who drink heavily moderate their alcohol use in later life." Marlatt & Baer, 
supra note 20, at 231. See also, e.g., D. Cahalan & R. Room, Problem Drinking Among 
American Men 51-52 (1974) (Monograph reporting findings from two national surveys 
conducted in 1967 and 1969 and from a community survey of San Francisco in 1967-68, 
showing a rapid decline in drinking behavior between ages 20 and 30, and suggesting that 
problem drinking among young adults is a "temporary phenomenon."). 
47 An interesting paper compared three groups attempting to stop smoking, one group on 
its own and the other two in different treatment programs. All three groups rated as the most 
important factor in stopping "self liberation"-the daily personal commitment to quit. See Di 
Clemente & Prochaska, Self-Change and Therapy-Change of Smoking Behavior: A 
Comparison of Processes of Change in Cessation and Maintenance, 7 Addictive Behaviors 133 
(1982). Marsh surveyed 2,700 British smokers and found that quitting required smokers to 
create a new set of beliefs that not smoking was itself a desirable and rewarding state to 
achieve. See Marsh, supra note 26, at 17. More recent studies confirm these results. One 
study compared the performance of persons attempting to stop smoking in treatment programs 
and on their own and found that the latter did better. The factors that best predicted success 
"appear to support the hypothesis that cognitions about health, locus of control, and self- 
efficacy are strongly associated with avoidance of relapse to tobacco smoking." Wojcik, Social 
Learning Predictors of the Avoidance of Smoking Relapse, 13 Addictive Behaviors 177, 179 
(1988). Another study of smoking cessation found that persons who quit held stronger beliefs 
than those who did not about the desirability of good health and the ability to control one's 
life, and were more confident of their ability to resist temptation. Tipton, The Effects of Beliefs 
About Smoking and Health on Smoking Cessation, 122 J. Psychology 313, 318 (1988). Similar 
results appear for persons who discontinue or moderate excessive alcohol consumption. See 
Hermos, Locastro, Glynn, Bouchard & de Labry, Predictors of Reduction and Cessation of 
Drinking in Community-Dwelling Men: Results from the Normative Aging Study, 49 J. Stud. 
on Alcohol 363, 366-68 (1988); see also Canton, Giannini, Magni, Bertinaria, Cibin & 
Gallimberti, Locus of Control, Life Events and Treatment Outcome in Alcohol Dependent 
Patients, 78 Acta Psychiatrica Scandanavica 18, 19, 21 (1988) (Individuals with an "internal 
locus of control"-those who feel that they are in control of themselves and their 
environments-present more favorable treatment outcomes than those with an "external locus 
of control"-those who see themselves at the mercy of fate and other forces.). Some smokers 
and drinkers apparently are able to acquire second-order volitions that imply effective first- 
order desires not to consume excessively. 
48 See H. Fingarette & A. Hasse, supra note 18, at 175-86; Fingarette, supra note 20, at 19- 
20. 
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out therapy suggests that the desire of the addict to change is the most 
important factor in getting straight. 
The CV, in sum, can account for aspects of addictive behavior that 
other views of addiction have difficulty explaining. It helps to show 
why only some people become addicts, why some addicts can discon- 
tinue the use of addictive substances but others cannot, why some 
people engage in excessive and compulsive behaviors such as gam- 
bling and sex though they do not consume substances, and why some 
detoxified addicts often relapse to addiction. In each of these cases, 
being addicted, or not being addicted, is adaptive for the person 
involved. This way of putting the CV may make it seem tautologi- 
cal-people are doing what they want because people by definition do 
what they want-but the extensive evidence cited above, much of 
which is drawn from studies of individual addicts, refutes this charge. 
Also, when the CV is stated as an economic theory, it generates testa- 
ble predictions that the facts so far confirm. 
An economic analysis of smoking, for example, generates two sets 
of verifiable predictions. Initially, since ill health and early death are 
costs, an economic analysis predicts that cigarette consumption 
should decline as information about the dangers of smoking becomes 
better known. Such information first became widespread in the 
1950's. A recent study estimated what per capita smoking consump- 
tion would have been and what percentage of the population would 
have smoked in 1980 had no information about smoking's hazards 
ever been made available and compared these hypothetical figures to 
actual 1980 data. Without information, per capita consumption for 
ages eighteen and over would have been 386 packs per year and 
54.2% of the population would have smoked; in 1980, actual per cap- 
ita consumption was 195 packs per year and 32.5% of the population 
smoked.49 Biological and substance caused views of addiction cannot 
explain why addictive behavior should moderate substantially in 
response to information about its hazards; a defining feature of these 
49 See Ippolito & Ippolito, Measuring the Value of Life Saving from Consumer Reactions to 
New Information, 25 J. Pub. Econ. 53, 62 (1984). The recent Surgeon General's report on 
nicotine addiction states that in the United States in 1985 32.7% of men and 28.3% of women 
smoked regularly. Nicotine Addiction, supra note 4, at 16. The Ippolito analysis likely 
overstates the impact of new information on smoking activity because many people moderated 
their smoking not because they learned new things about it but because their tastes changed; 
they came to value good health relatively more and the pleasures of smoking relatively less. 
See supra note 47. 
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views is the belief that addicts cannot respond "rationally" to appeals 
to self-interest. 
The second set of predictions rests on a more complex analysis. In 
contrast to the assumptions that underlie the SSCV, suppose that the 
benefits one obtains from an activity such as smoking initially increase 
and then level off; one first learns how to enjoy cigarettes and then 
derives about as much pleasure from smoking at forty as at thirty.50 
A utility function that describes the pleasure one derives from smok- 
ing over time thus is concave. The cost to a consumer of smoking a 
cigarette-k in Part I.B above-now is assumed not to be constant. 
To perceive the shape of the "consumption cost curve" for smoking, 
suppose first that the benefits which a smoker derives from smoking 
exceed the monetary cost of cigarettes. Then, were there no health 
hazards associated with smoking, a person who began to smoke 
would never stop. This assumption is made both because it seems 
plausible and because it permits attention to be focused on the health 
hazards of smoking in an analysis of smoking behavior. There are 
two such hazards to consider. First, smoking shortens a person's life. 
Second, the effects of smoking can reduce the quality of life. If one 
begins smoking when young and quits by age thirty, the first cost 
apparently is zero; the life expectancy of people who quit by thirty 
and of people who never smoke is the same.51 The time necessary to 
dissipate the effects of smoking also is age related. If one quits when 
young, the effects of smoking are fully dissipated in nine or ten years, 
but these effects take up to twenty years to dissipate if one quits 
50 Smoking is associated with reduced anxiety and a greater sense of self-efficacy. See, e.g., 
Gilbert & Spielberger, Effects of Smoking on Heart Rate, Anxiety and Feelings of Success 
During Social Interaction, 10 J. Behavioral Med. 629 (1987). There is no reason to believe that 
the "units" of such benefits that a person derives from smoking a cigarette increase 
substantially over a person's life. 
51 The evidence in the next two paragraphs derives from R. Arnott, F. Lewis & N. Olewiler, 
Cigarette Smoking and Quitting: A Life-Cycle Approach (Discussion Paper #709, Queens 
University 1988) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association). These authors, in turn, 
rely largely on Hammond, Smoking in Relation to the Death Rates of One Million Men and 
Women, in Epidemiological Approaches to the Study of Cancer and Other Diseases 127 
(National Cancer Institute Monograph 19, W. Haenszel ed. 1966) [hereinafter Hammond 
Study]. This is a useful data base both because it is very large and because many of the 
respondents began to smoke before social attitudes about smoking had changed; hence, the 
respondents may have been influenced by "purely" cost benefit factors. 
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later.52 In the interim, these effects can influence health. The con- 
sumption cost curve thus is flat at zero for young people and begins to 
rise when people are in their thirties. The curve then declines for 
smokers in their sixties; by then so much damage has been done that 
the body cannot recover through abstinence in a typical smoker's 
expected remaining lifetime, so the health cost of further smoking 
falls substantially. An economic analysis holds that a person will con- 
tinue to smoke until the marginal costs of quitting-the sum of the 
benefits that one who quits forgoes and the physical discomforts of 
withdrawal that he incurs-fall below the marginal costs of continu- 
ance. 
This view generates three predictions of smoking behavior that are 
roughly consistent with the evidence. First, the optimal quitting age 
will vary from a smoker's mid-forties to her mid-sixties. Because the 
benefits that smoking provides, and thus the opportunity cost of quit- 
ting, level off over time, a curve that describes the costs of quitting- 
the QC curve in Figure I-should first increase and then flatten out.53 
The rising consumption cost curve, beginning in a smoker's thirties, 
should begin to intersect the by-then relatively flat quitting curve 
sometime during these ages. In Figure I, a person thus smokes until 
time t*, when the marginal cost of quitting and the marginal cost of 
continuance are equal; this point is reached when the QC and CC 
curves intersect. The evidence indicates that people do quit roughly 
in accordance with this pattern. For example, studies showed that, 
among males, in 1955, 15.2% of the age cohort thirty-five to forty- 
four were ex-smokers while 26.5% of the age cohort sixty to sixty- 
four were ex-smokers; in 1983, the corresponding values were 42% 
and 57.5%.54 Second, some people never will quit because their con- 
sumption cost curves reach a maximum before intersecting their mar- 
ginal quitting curves; for such people, the cost of continuing to smoke 
has become largely historical and thus will not motivate quitting. 
52 Apparently, the cost of smoking rises in one's thirties both because of the cumulative 
effects of smoking to this time and because the body then is more susceptible to the damage 
that cigarettes can cause and takes longer to dissipate this damage. See R. Arnott, F. Lewis & 
N. Olewiler, supra note 51, at 8-12 analyzing data from Hammond Study, supra note 51. 
53 The QC curve is the sum of two values, the benefits forgone from smoking and the 
physical costs of withdrawal discounted to present value should one decide in t - i days to stop 
in period t. The curve is concave because consumption benefits level off and because 
withdrawal costs seem not to increase much after one becomes a smoker. 
54 See R. Arnott, F. Lewis & N. Olewiler, supra note 51, table 10. 
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Figure I captures this phenomenon by drawing a CC' curve that never 
crosses the QC curve. As is well known, some smokers never do quit. 
Third, and perhaps less obviously, smokers are more likely to begin 
at early ages. When one is young, consumption cost is zero, so one 
will smoke if smoking generates any positive utility. The consump- 
tion cost curve begins to rise in a person's thirties. For some adults 
who contemplate beginning to smoke in their thirties, the (then 
increasing) consumption cost curve for smoking always will exceed 
the (also increasing) quitting cost curve; such persons never will 
begin. This phenomenon is captured in Figure II by showing a CC 
curve that always lies above the QC curve. Hence, a cross-sectional 
study of smokers should show that a larger percentage began early 
rather than late. Less than ten percent of the respondents in a major 
smoking study began after age twenty-four.55 
Finally, if addicts were responsive to cost benefit considerations, 
such products as tobacco and alcohol would have price elasticities of 
demand that exceed zero. Studies confirm this prediction. The 
demand for cigarettes and liquor responds to price in the way that is 
predicted for other goods.56 
The claim here is not that economists have fully explained the 
nature of addiction, but rather that addicts engage in maximizing 
behavior. The data support this claim because economic analysis 
assumes that people attempt to maximize expected utility. If an eco- 
nomic view of addiction predicts better than views that assume that 
people are enslaved by substances or their genes, then addiction likely 
is best understood with the aid of causal theories that make acting in 
accordance with one's will the major explanatory factor.57 
55 See Hammond study, supra note 51, at 128, table 1. 
56 See Becker & Murphy, supra note 35, at 686 (citing studies respecting the price elasticity 
of cigarettes); Coate & Grossman, Effects of Alcoholic Beverage Prices and Legal Drinking 
Ages on Youth Alcohol Use, 31 J. Law & Econ. 145 (1988) (effects of "substantial" price 
elasticity on probability of frequent drinking); Orstein & Hanssens, Alcohol Control Laws 
and the Consumption of Distilled Spirits and Beer, 12 J. Consumer Res. 200, 207-11 (1985) 
(demand is price elastic for distilled spirits but much less so for beer); and Saffer & Grossman, 
Beer Taxes, the Legal Drinking Age, and Youth Motor Vehicle Fatalities, 16 J. Legal Stud. 
351 (1987) (raising beer prices would substantially reduce number of fatal injuries). 
57 Psychologists have recently done considerable research on alcoholism and substance 
abuse using a paradigm that is similar to the economic paradigm. According to the 
psychologists, alcohol and drugs are "reinforcers"; that is, they reduce a drive state existing in 
the organism. Psychological theory then predicts that use of a reinforcer will decline if 
constraints on its use increase. For example, use is predicted to decline if the amount of 
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The characterological view nevertheless may seem implausible 
because it apparently fails to capture two defining features of addic- 
tion: the sense, shared by addicts and observers, that addicts are pris- 
oners of their desires and the related sense that no one rationally 
chooses the status of prisoner. This apparent implausibility seems 
best dissolved by returning to the distinction between effective first- 
order desires and second-order volitions. Character is importantly a 
function of second-order volitions: one chooses volitions that imply a 
preferred set of effective first-order desires-to want to want effec- 
tively to consume culture, to act as would a true friend and the like. 
On this view, being addicted never is knowingly chosen because one 
would never cultivate volitions that implied a first-order desire to 
abuse substances, to be prey, that is, to shameful but irresistable 
urges. This analysis is appealing, but is also consistent with the CV. 
Characters are not chosen all at once, but rather are acquired over 
time. In consequence, no one can choose her character-form a set of 
second-order volitions that together constitute a certain way of life- 
in the full awareness of all that the choice implies; a part of the wis- 
dom one gains from living is a more complete understanding of the 
implications of possessing the character one has. Aspects of this 
understanding often are perceived as surprises: "I did not realize I 
was that sort of person" and the like. On the CV, some people come 
to learn that their characters and circumstances best imply a life in 
which alcohol, say, plays a major role. To quit thus entails altering 
one's character-one's set of second-order volitions-in such fashion 
behavior required for consumption is increased. Also, use is predicted to increase if 
constraints on access to reinforcers that could substitute for the reinforcer at issue are 
increased. These predictions are similar to predictions from economic theory that 
consumption varies inversely with price and directly with increases in the prices of substitutes. 
A recent review of the experiments that sought to test the psychological theory, which cites 
117 references, concludes that the theory has "considerable experimental support." In 
particular, 
preference for alcohol (a) varies inversely with direct constraints on access to alcohol 
and (b) varies inversely with the availability of alternative reinforcers and directly with 
constraints on access to them ... [T]he evidence with respect to the effect of direct 
constraints justifies a high level of confidence. Because these studies involved alcoholics 
and drug abusers in laboratory and clinical settings, as well as animals and nonclinical 
populations of humans, the generality of this variable for an experimental analysis of the 
determinants of alcohol abuse seems well established. 
Vuchinich & Tucker, Contributions from Behavioral Theories of Choice to an Analysis of 
Alcohol Abuse, 97 J. Abnormal Psychology 181, 185 (1988). These behavioral studies also 
support the view that addicts engage in maximizing behavior. 
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that addiction is no longer implied. Altering one's character is suffi- 
ciently difficult that only some will do it. This way of putting the CV 
accounts for the two noticeable features of addiction referred to 
above: people in the short run are captives of their characters and do 
choose characters in ignorance of many of their important implica- 
tions. But to say this is not to impeach the characterological view; 
according to it, people choose addiction freely given who they turn 
out to be and quit when they want to be different people.58 The evi- 
dence most strongly supports this view. 
Summary 
There are, broadly speaking, two conceptions of addiction. One 
holds that substances can induce addiction in ordinary persons-the 
SSCV-or in persons with particular biological predispositions-the 
BV. Both versions of this conception implicitly identify addiction 
with coercion. A substance, they claim, is addicting when (a) users 
rationally choose the negative utility of consumption (the substance 
no longer provides pleasure) rather than the greater negative utility of 
incurring physical withdrawal costs, and (b) the substance creates 
these physical withdrawal costs because they are a product of con- 
sumption-induced physical changes in users. The analogy to coercion 
is close. Just as the robber forces the victim to choose the negative 
utility of surrendering the money over the greater negative utility of 
incurring physical pain, an addictive substance forces its victim to 
choose the negative utility of excessive consumption over the greater 
negative utility that withdrawal would cause. Also, in both cases the 
victim's plight is traceable to an outside source: the robber is external 
and comes unasked; the substance is external in the sense that it 
causes the user's body to change, and it too comes unasked because 
the user begins to consume in ignorance and learns too late. These 
58 Orford's book-length review of the addiction literature concluded its summary of the 
decision to quit with the observation: 
Particularly with very difficult decisions, when attachment is strong and costs high, 
conflict is extreme and change involves not only high quality information processing but 
also self-reconstitution, the adoption of a new identity, a shift of attitudes and values 
across a wide range of issues. Change-supporting agencies have often taken a religious 
form. 
Orford, supra note 15, at 322. Similar evidence is summarized more briefly in Marlatt & Baer, 
supra note 20, at 237-38. 
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defining features of an addictive substance explain why addiction is a 
paradigmatic example in the free will literature of a coerced choice. 
The competing conception of addiction-the CV-rejects the anal- 
ogy to coercion in favor of the view that addictions are chosen. 
According to this latter conception, a person is addicted to a product 
when (a) the utility of excessive consumption is positive; and (b) the 
user continues not because use entails incurring the lesser of two neg- 
ative utilities, but because cessation would cause a high opportunity 
cost loss (which can only occur when utility from consumption is pos- 
itive). To perceive the distinction between these competing concep- 
tions of addiction, suppose that a person smokes because smoking 
reduces anxiety and produces a greater sense of self-efficacy, and these 
effects are felt for as long as tobacco is used. Then smoking always 
generates more utility for the user than not smoking. The primary 
cost of withdrawal is the emotional pain of once more feeling anxious 
and insecure. The use of tobacco, however, would not cause the for- 
mer smoker to experience this pain; it will be felt because anxiety and 
insecurity are aspects of the smoker's preexisting character. There is, 
therefore, no outside source that coerces the smoker into retaining his 
addiction; rather, the addict chooses to smoke because smoking maxi- 
mizes his utility-it best reduces his anxiety and insecurity-given 
who the addict is. To hold that a person is coerced because he makes 
a choice that his character implies is to deprive the word coercion of 
meaning. A person acts freely when he acts in character. 
The evidence rejects the conception of addiction that underlies the 
SSCV and BV in favor of the CV. The normative implications of this 
conclusion are considered next. 
III. NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS 
This Article asks whether courts should impose tort liability on 
firms that have failed to warn of the addictive nature of their products 
and whether the state should require firms, by statute or regulation, to 
add addiction warnings. Prudential and fairness considerations could 
dictate a negative answer to the first question while permitting a posi- 
tive answer to the second. If firms are held liable in tort, society will 
incur the disruption costs of effecting enormous wealth transfers by 
common law litigation. As the asbestos and DES situations show, 
these costs are immense. Also, fairness questions are raised when 
very large retroactive sanctions are imposed. Neither prudential nor 
1989] 545 
Virginia Law Review 
fairness considerations are germane when the question is whether the 
state should prospectively require firms to warn. As a consequence, 
evidence for particular views of addiction that is too weak to sustain 
common law liability could be sufficient to ground a case for statutory 
warnings. 
Part III will show that the SSCV and BV both imply a case for 
warnings but the CV does not, supposing warnings to serve only the 
function of providing the information that a utility-maximizing con- 
sumer would need. Because the evidence supports the CV more 
strongly than it supports the other views, Part III's analysis, together 
with the prudential and fairness considerations just raised, implies 
that no good case for holding current firms liable for failing to warn 
exists. Part III argues that the case for statutory warnings is unper- 
suasive also, supposing the CV to be true, but plausible grounds exist 
to contest this conclusion. 
A. Warnings and the SSCV 
The SSCV would support a state-created warning that particular 
products "are addictive" were the view credible, but it is not. There is 
a case for state-created warnings that physical withdrawal costs are 
associated with the use of certain products, on an analogy to current 
drug warnings that use can create sleeplessness or irritability and the 
like. Firms that have failed to warn against these withdrawal costs 
also should be liable to former addicts who have incurred them, but 
the costs seem so slight that there probably will be few cases. The 
SSCV cannot support holding firms liable for the full set of costs asso- 
ciated with the living of an addictive life because it is not the con- 
sumption of products that causes people to lead such lives. 
B. Warnings and the Biological View 
The BV may better support a case for outright bans than for warn- 
ings. It holds that some people are strongly predisposed to become 
addicted to particular substances, in the sense that many of the people 
with the wrong biology will use these substances forever once exposed 
and that no one can stop without medical assistance or similar inten- 
sive third party intervention. Warnings thus seem helpful only to the 
extent that they permit potential users to sort themselves out; the 
warning will frighten off people with the wrong biology while the rest 
can go ahead. This is the case for warning people of drug side effects 
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that only some users will experience, but such sorting is impossible 
when addiction is at issue. There is no way to know, by such means 
as a blood test or medical examination, who will abuse a particular 
substance; only use tells. The warning solution therefore prevents no 
evil and permits much. If a nontrivial percentage of the population is 
biologically strongly predisposed to become addicted to a particular 
substance, the substance seems better banned.59 
This argument is less attractive than first appears because it fails to 
count the pleasure that use provides to the biologically safe. To per- 
ceive this, suppose that n percent of the population are so constructed 
biologically that they will become addicted to a substance; (1 - n)% 
are able to use the substance in moderation and will derive considera- 
ble pleasure from it; and no one knows before use into which category 
she falls. Then there is a good case for a warning that discloses the 
odds. It is the case for permitting people who are informed of the risk 
to choose dangerous jobs: no one knows in advance whom such jobs 
will kill or injure; at best, the odds are known. But those who are not 
seriously injured or killed can pursue their most preferred life plan 
and the others are compensated for the risk in the wage rate. This 
argument does not turn on the size of n, though if n is very large, it 
may be impossible to pay people enough to take the risk of using the 
substance. Then the substance will not be sold, but when choice is 
fully informed, the no-sale outcome is as consistent with a respect for 
autonomy as the sale outcome. Hence, the state should only require 
the makers of substances that addict subsets of users to disclose the 
odds. 
This defense of warnings against bans is problematic if the state of 
being addicted is incommensurable. Disclosure that warns people 
against an outcome whose reality they cannot imagine is unhelpful. 
This problem may be serious because, apart from use, the best way to 
understand what being addicted means is to observe its effects, and 
young people, who are society's primary concern, may have seen too 
little of life. On the other hand, society lets young people volunteer 
for the military and work on suspension bridges. Is addiction less 
59 The BV differs from the SSCV respecting addiction only in that, in the BV, a subset of 
users rather than almost everyone will be hooked by an addictive substance. Hence, if the BV 
supports a case for bans, the SSCV supports a stronger case since, if it is true, the relevant 
substance will harm more people. The relation between bans and the SSCV is not considered 
in text because the view itself is not credible. 
1989] 547 
Virginia Law Review 
commensurable than death? Can this question be answered without 
making a normative choice among ways of life? Persons who value 
honor, courage, and being in control are more likely than bohemian 
pacifists to regard the choice to be a soldier as fully informed and the 
choice to consume heroin, even with a warning, as not. There is no 
obvious answer to the incommensurability problem.60 
What can be said is that the biological view can support both cases 
for banning substances and for requiring warnings against their use, 
though it is difficult to choose between these strategies. The case for 
warnings will support a cause of action against firms for failing to give 
them. As shown above, though, the view that biological factors cause 
excessive appetitive behavior is too weak as a matter of fact to sustain 
this case. 
C. Warnings and the Characterological View 
1. A General Analysis 
The characterological view does not support a case for warnings 
because warnings on the labels of addictive products would provide 
no useful information to persons who hold the correct view of addic- 
tion and likely would increase addictive behavior by the less informed. 
To understand the reasoning that generates these conclusions, sup- 
pose first that firms offer a set of products for sale denominated as 
{a,b,c, ...... n E P and that only c will hook people with the wrong 
characters. The set of consumers is A,B,C . The "A's" have addic- 
tive characters, the "B's" will derive pleasure from c but be able to use 
it moderately, and the "C's" will derive no utility from c and not buy 
it again. The question is whether firms that sell c should accompany 
it with a warning that reads "This product is addictive." This phrase 
is referred to as "the minimal warning." 
Begin in the context of a products liability suit and consider two 
cases. In the first, no one knows her character type, but that some 
people consume c to excess is common knowledge. For example, sup- 
pose everyone knows that some people abuse alcohol. Requiring the 
60 Society sometimes attempts a compromise among these positions by banning the sale of 
substances to children, but permitting their sale to adults with warnings. This solution is the 
more appealing the less plausible is the biological view of addiction; for, as the evidence with 
alcohol and tobacco shows, the solution permits substantial access by children to the 
substances in question. 
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minimal warning seems pointless because it adds nothing to common 
knowledge; in the absence of the warning a potential consumer knows 
that she might or might not consume to excess, depending on her 
character, and she knows no more than this after receiving the mini- 
mal warning. Requiring a more detailed warning, such as a portrayal 
of the quality of a substance abuser's life, poses a disclosure task more 
complex than courts usually are asked to oversee. In this case, then, 
the firms should not be liable. This analysis itself may resolve the 
cigarette cases because apparently everyone knows that some smokers 
get hooked. It also may resolve these cases for one who accepts the 
biological view, if such an observer also believes that knowledge of the 
odds of a smoking addiction is widely held. 
In the second case, no one knows her character type nor does any- 
one know which of products a, b, and c, if any of them, are used 
abusively. Firms that sell c should not be held liable for failing to give 
the minimal warning in this second case because, on the CV, there is 
no danger to be warned against. The CV holds that a person chooses 
to become addicted because frequent use of the substance is best for 
him, all in all, given who he is. To see what this view implies here, 
suppose first that the warning is given in connection with the sale of 
product c. Then everyone would consume the product if they held 
the characterological view of addiction.61 A potential consumer 
would know that she has either an A, a B, or a C character. If she is a 
C, she will derive utility Uo = 0 from use because she will try the 
product once and stop. Let a B derive utility U1 from use where 
U, >0; moderate use is pleasurable. An A will derive utility U2 from 
use where U2 > 0; addicts consume because long-term heavy use yields 
them pleasures in excess of pains. The illustrative consumer thus will 
buy at least once in face of the warning because, given these values, 
her expected utility from the purchase is positive. 
Next, let the firms not warn. Then the consumer will know only 
that the product will addict her with probability 1/P, but the choice 
to consume still has positive expected utility and so will still be made. 
The absence of a warning therefore will not influence a consumer's 
behavior. Sellers of product c thus cannot have violated a legal duty 
by failing to warn because the sellers only withheld information that 
61 The case against warnings seems strengthened if typical consumers hold either of the 
other two views of addiction. See infra p. 449. 
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would have been valueless to the recipient. Another way to put this 
conclusion begins with the point that a warning against addiction is 
desirable only if potential users should be told that consumption will 
be difficult to conclude. But if use generates positive expected utility 
for everyone, cessation will be difficult only because it will entail for- 
going pleasure. That there is an opportunity cost to giving up things 
one likes has never been thought to be the type of danger that firms 
should be required to warn against. 
The analysis to here assumed that consumers know neither their 
characters nor which products are sometimes abused. Suppose that 
each consumer actually knows whether he is liable to consume to 
excess-whether he has an addictive character. Then those consum- 
ers who are "A's" would want to be told which products are abused 
because these products are best for them given their characters. 
Firms, however, do not wrong consumers by failing to advertise 
everything favorable about their products that any potential user may 
want to know.62 Hence, there apparently is no legal duty that firms 
violate when they fail to give the minimal warning against addiction, 
whether consumers know their characters or not. 
It may be helpful to conclude this analysis by comparing the impli- 
cations that the CV has for warnings to the implications that can be 
derived from the SSCV view of addiction for which the Ulysses and 
the Sirens legend is metaphor. In the story, Ulysses' most preferred 
life plan was to return home and he knew that he would be unable to 
carry this plan out without taking special measures; the Sirens would 
otherwise lure him and his crew to disaster. Hence, his choice was 
not to "consume" the Sirens' song-to put wax in his ears-or to use 
a precommitment strategy-to have himself tied to the mast-that 
protected against the adverse consequences of consumption. Circe 
had what today would be called a duty to inform Ulysses about the 
Sirens in consequence of their nature-that their song enslaved 
everyone. 
Suppose instead that Ulysses was unsure whether he was the sort of 
person who would prefer to return home no matter what other 
62 A beer manufacturer once advertised that "Schaeffer is the one beer to have when you're 
having more than one," apparently because market surveys showed that considerable beer was 
drunk by persons who seldom consumed one at a time. It has, however, never been claimed 
that the law should require firms to advertise the attributes of their products that are especially 
attractive to heavy users. 
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options life offered or the sort who would prefer Sirens over home and 
family ties were he to meet with Sirens (in this CV-motivated modifi- 
cation, Sirens just provide pleasure, but occupy all of one's time). 
Ulysses knew that if he were the former type, he could tarry with 
Sirens if he met them but easily leave to enjoy the pleasures of home 
and hearth; and that if he were the latter type and it ultimately 
brought him insufficient joy, he could change to the former, though at 
a cost. This Ulysses has a different problem than the Ulysses of the 
legend. The Ulysses posited here knows ex ante that he will learn 
nothing new about Sirens when he meets them; he is well informed 
about Sirens. Rather, he will later learn something about his type- 
whether he is the sort who prefers Sirens in moderation or to excess. 
Thus, this Ulysses does not need to guard against making an ex post 
change of plan, resulting from a Siren-induced addiction, that he 
regards as unacceptable when viewed ex ante. His problem instead is 
to maximize his expected utility respecting Sirens conditional on his 
type. Indeed, if the characterological view of addiction is accurate, 
the notion of guarding against a change of plan is unintelligible as 
applied to persons who are well informed about the alternatives they 
will face. 
Ulysses would find tying himself to the mast optimal in this version 
of the story only if the utility he would get from listening to Sirens 
just once exceeded the sum of the expected values from (i) the 
pleasures of visiting Sirens for as long as he liked were he a nonaddic- 
tive sort; (ii) the pleasures of living forever with Sirens were he an 
addictive sort, discounted by the probability that he will want to be 
addicted forever; and (iii) the pleasures of living with Sirens in an 
addicted state until he decided to alter his character, less the cost 
entailed in altering his character were he to turn out to be a Siren- 
preferring type, discounted by the probability that he will want later 
to change to another type.63 If the cost of changing from a Siren pre- 
ferrer to a home preferrer is no greater than the apparent costs of 
63 For those who find a formal statement helpful, suppose that Ulysses is warned about 
Sirens. Let Uo be the utility of tying himself to the mast-of listening to the Sirens once. U1 
and U2 are the utilities of contact with Sirens depending on whether one is a nonaddictive sort 
or an A: Uo>0; Ui>0; U2>0. Let q be the probability that one is an A and r be the 
probability that one who is an A will later want to change to a B at time t. Also, d is Ulysses' 
discount rate; e is the relevant interest rate; c is the cost of changing his type; and he will want 
to change his type at time t or never. Ulysses will walk the deck if 
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withdrawal from such standard addictions as tobacco and alcohol, 
then the three pleasures, which together are the opportunity cost of 
forgoing all but one contact with Sirens, likely would dominate; an 
informed Ulysses would reject restraint. 
Circe then had no duty to tell Ulysses that some people do choose 
to live with Sirens forever, were he ignorant of this fact. Such an 
unwarned Ulysses would not know that Sirens were addicting to sus- 
ceptible sorts, but rather that Sirens with positive probability were a 
member of the class of things that do this. His expected utility from 
remaining free would still exceed the expected utility of restraint.4 
Consequently, as said above, not to warn is to withhold from Ulysses 
no information of value; he will risk visiting Sirens whether warned or 
not because in either case the visit would yield him net expected bene- 
fits. The characterological view of addiction holds that this modified 
version of the Ulysses story best fits the evidence, and to accept this is 
to conclude that firms which omit warnings have not violated any 
legal duty and so should not be held liable.65 
T T t 
dS(l-q) U, + q[(l-r) Z U2 + r(IU2]j - d(rc) > Uo. 
0 o o 
The three terms in braces are positive. These terms are moderate pleasure forever, addictive 
pleasure forever, and addictive pleasure until Ulysses wants to change. All three terms also 
exceed Uo because Uo is the utility of listening to Sirens just once. Therefore, unless 
withdrawal cost c is very high in relation to the gains from use, the left-hand side of the 
inequality will exceed the right-hand side; an informed Ulysses would eschew the mast. The 
claim here is not that consumers always would solve such inequalities perfectly, but that 
warnings are unnecessary for people who are doing as well as they can. Warnings would not 
help people who make mistakes in calculations such as these because mistakes likely would be 
random, not always in a particular direction. 
64 To perceive this clearly, recall that the expression to the left of the inequality in note 63 is 
the expected value of risking contact with Sirens when they are known to be addictive. Let 
this value be E(Ux). Then let s be the probability, for an unwarned Ulysses, that Sirens addict; 
if not, users derive utility U1 from visiting them. Without a warning, Ulysses will reject 
restraint if s(E(Ux)) +d(l -s) ZT U1 > Uo. If the first term on the left exceeds Uo, which the 
text assumes, then the entire expression exceeds Uo because the second term is positive. 
Ulysses will reject restraint whether warned or not. 
65 The Ulysses analysis suggests another possibility, that firms should warn potential users 
that the costs of character change probably are high. For the reasons given in Part III.C.4, 
infra, such disclosure cannot be made on product labels. Thus the failure to give it cannot 
ground tort liability. 
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2. Objections to the General Analysis 
Three objections to the conclusion that firms should not be held 
liable for failing to give the minimal warning against addiction 
deserve discussion: the lack of a minimal warning (i) forecloses com- 
mon precommitment strategies; (ii) prevents a person from "choos- 
ing" her preferred addiction; and (iii) prevents a person from 
remaining ignorant of possibly unfortunate aspects of her character. 
These objections are interesting but unpersuasive. The argument 
respecting precommitment is best captured by an example: Let a per- 
son decide to consume ice cream only in restaurants and not at home, 
because were he to bring a container of ice cream home, he would be 
unable to resist eating all of it. Such a consumer would want to know 
that what he was buying was ice cream and not something else. This 
person's plight is not relevant here. Firms should be required to dis- 
close what they are selling so people can pursue whatever consump- 
tion strategies they consider optimal. The issue is whether the label 
that reads "ice cream" should add, for the benefit of a first-time user, 
that ice cream "is addictive." This is unnecessary for the reasons 
above; a first-time user would buy the product whether warned or not, 
and the experience he gained through use would permit him to pursue 
precommitment strategies if he thought them best. 
Respecting the choice of a preferred addiction, suppose (a) a person 
has a character that is prone to excess; (b) the set of adaptations she 
can make given her character has two members-she can be a smoker 
or a compulsive runner; (c) were she perfectly informed, she would 
choose to run; (d) the cigarette makers do not warn against addiction 
and the person first smokes; and (e) the choice of adaptations is path 
dependent-to choose to smoke forecloses or makes materially more 
difficult the choice to run. Under the regnant conception of warnings, 
which holds that firms should be required to warn only against defects 
in a product that could reduce a person's utility-that the product 
may cause cancer, say-there is no reason to warn this person. For 
all anyone can know, she will derive greater utility from a life as a 
smoker than from a life as a runner. There is a broader conception of 
warnings, which holds that a firm is required to warn against any 
nontrivial property of a product that some consumers might consider 
relevant. A product property that satisfies this criterion is that use 
may induce a choice of life plan that a well-informed consumer would 
reject ex ante. 
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Even under this broader conception of the function that warnings 
should serve, there is no good cause for holding liable firms that fail to 
give the minimal warning. The crucial premise is (e) and it can be put 
in two ways. First, path dependence exists because substances are 
enslaving-this version is just the SSCV or BV and is unsound. Sec- 
ond, path dependence exists because the choice to consume certain 
substances changes preferences-one who smokes no longer wants to 
run. This formulation implies that premise (e) falls if preferences are 
stable-that is, invariant to the order of consumption. Then the per- 
son would try smoking and running and end up running because she 
prefers it, in the way people try liquor and wine and end up wine 
drinkers if they like wine best. If preferences are stable, trial and 
error will teach a person what suits. 
When the issue is perceived to turn on the robustness of ex ante 
preference orderings to product experimentation, the path depen- 
dence objection to not requiring the minimal warning seems unper- 
suasive. This is not because path dependence never governs people's 
behavior; any serious choice of a way to live cuts off alternatives. The 
issue, however, is whether the choice to try such products as ciga- 
rettes and liquor is considerably more likely to alter preferences than 
other consumption choices that people routinely make. No theories 
except for the SSCV or BV give a positive answer to this question. 
The CV implies a negative answer, as does the evidence that many 
people sample tobacco, alcohol, and heroin and quickly give these 
substances up altogether or use them in moderation. Common intu- 
itions are consistent with the CV and this formally gathered evidence. 
These intuitions suggest that it is less likely, for example, to "become 
a different person" after the first few smokes than to fall in love at first 
sight. Warnings are relevant only to initial users, however; after a 
time, persons have experience. The issue is empirical, but there seems 
too little evidence of strong path dependent consumption preferences 
to justify the imposition of common law liability for failing to warn, 
even under the broad function of warning law now assumed to 
obtain.66 
66 This conclusion is not meant to deny that people sometimes adapt their preferences to the 
circumstances of their lives; it is sanity to try to like winters if one is compelled to live in 
Minnesota, and some people actually come to prefer them and refuse jobs in the South. The 
issue here rather is whether smoking a pack of cigarettes or taking some drinks will materially 
alter one's preference set. This seems less likely. 
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The third objection to not requiring the minimal warning holds 
that some people suspect they may have addictive personalities but do 
not want to find out, and so would like to be warned away from addic- 
tive products. For example, a person suspects that he may become 
addicted to drugs if he ever has the chance, but does not want this 
fear confirmed; hence, he will not try-he is just strong enough to 
avoid-drugs that might addict. This consumer cannot pursue his 
consumption strategy unless the minimal warning is put on every 
product that a nontrivial set of buyers is likely to abuse. On the CV, 
addicts engage in maximizing behavior. Hence, this justification for 
requiring the minimal warning is unsound under the conventional 
view of warnings, which holds that warnings are meant to convey 
information about possibilities that are utility reducing. The broader 
view of warnings would support a different result, if a substantial 
number of consumers pursued such self-paternalistic strategies; these 
consumers would find the warning germane. The number of consum- 
ers who actually use these strategies seems too small to sustain this 
case for warnings. 
In the short run, a person only can make better or worse adapta- 
tions to who he is; to adapt for the better is to maximize one's utility 
conditional on one's type. In contrast, to choose the strategy of 
remaining ignorant is to risk adapting for the worse because the pos- 
ited consumption strategy permits the possibility that a consumer will 
eschew consumption patterns that are best for him given who he is. 
Some people do self-consciously pursue strategies that reduce the like- 
lihood that they will make first-best adaptations to life, but there is 
little evidence that this is a common pattern. It seems unwise to incur 
the large costs that would attend the creation of a retroactive duty to 
warn just because a few people may prefer the strategy of actively 
concealing from themselves the characters they have. 
3. Requiring the Minimal Warning by Statute 
The analysis to here seems appealing in the context of lawsuits that 
have retroactive application but may be thought less persuasive when 
the issue is whether the minimal warning should be required by stat- 
ute. Adding the minimal warning to a product's label would not be 
costly. Also, there is at least a chance that the BV or SSCV will turn 
out to be true, in which case the statutory warning may do some 
good. Further, there may be something to be said for the broader 
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conception of warnings set out above, whereby firms should warn cus- 
tomers against all product properties that would affect the consump- 
tion choices of substantial subsets of users. Under this conception, 
the path dependence and concealing-one's-character-from-oneself 
objections to not requiring the minimal warning ultimately turn on 
the facts. The facts are not so conclusively against these objections as 
to make yielding to them in the relatively costless context of requiring 
statutory warnings a silly public strategy to pursue. There is, finally, 
a further function that warnings can serve, which is to express the 
state's view concerning the propriety of using certain legal products at 
all, or in particular circumstances. Under this function, the state 
could use the vehicle of requiring the minimal warning to make a 
symbolic, but helpful, condemnation of undesirable addictive behav- 
iors. For example, to require the minimal warning on a cigarette 
package is to tell consumers that society permits, but does not respect, 
their decision to smoke. 
All of these justifications for requiring the minimal warning by stat- 
ute suppose that the only cost of the requirement would be to add a 
few words to the product's label. The justifications become questiona- 
ble when it is realized that there are other likely costs. Initially, when 
the characters of people who do and do not become addicted are con- 
sidered, and when some people's misconceptions about the nature of 
addiction are taken into account, a required minimal warning is likely 
to generate the wrong user mix. The warning would frighten away 
many people who are unlikely to become addicted because they value 
conformity, being in control, and succeeding as measured by common 
criteria, but who accept the SSCV or the BV. These people would 
lose the pleasure that moderate consumption brings. On the other 
hand, people with a propensity to engage in nonconforming or thrill- 
seeking behavior would be more likely to use the product in conse- 
quence of the warning; they will take a warning as a dare or regard 
products with warnings as more alluring to them just in virtue of their 
having been identified as risky.67 Such users become addicts with a 
higher probability than the norm. In addition, to label a product 
67 This insight is not new. For example, Romans 7:7-8 states: 
Yet if it had not been for the law, I should not have known sin. I should not have 
known what it is to covet if the law had not said "You shall not covet." But sin, finding 
opportunity in the commandment, wrought in me all kinds of covetousness. Apart 
from the law sin lies dead. 
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"addictive" may convey the impression that consumption will be 
intensely pleasurable, at least for a time. This too could increase use. 
These reasons suggest that requiring the minimal warning against 
addiction could increase it while making nonaddicts worse off. 
Finally, to describe a product as "addictive" could suggest to users 
who hold incorrect views of addiction that giving the product up is 
impossible or at least exceedingly difficult; efforts to change one's biol- 
ogy or fight truly enslaving substances may seem pointless. Hence, 
requiring the minimal warning could discourage attempts by addicts 
to change their lives. 
Because addict populations are bad for society and because people 
probably would be better off were they not to possess characters that 
implied addiction, the likely consequences described here of giving the 
minimal warning are undesirable. The gains that may accrue from 
requiring the minimal warning by statute-for example, making a 
symbolic statement against addiction-seem too slight to risk exper- 
iencing these consequences. Therefore, if the characterological view is 
accurate, the minimal warning should not be required at all. 
4. Requiring A More Extensive Warning 
Requiring a more extensive warning seems impossible. There are 
four categories of information that potential users may find helpful. 
First, the consequences of consuming particular products to excess 
could be described in detail. Then people might be more strongly 
motivated to cultivate the kinds of characters for which addiction is a 
poor solution to life's problems. Here a distinction should be made. 
One set of dangers from excessive consumption is physical; long-term 
smoking, for example, causes cancer. It is possible and desirable to 
convey health-related data of this type; doing so is now often 
required. Another set of dangers from addiction entails living a 
blighted life, in which one cannot hold a job or sustain personal rela- 
tionships and the like. Information of this latter sort seems better 
conveyed in schools and by moral instruction than through product 
labels; it is difficult to see how it could be conveyed on labels at all. 
Second, the type of characters that are strongly associated with addic- 
tion could be disclosed; the analogy is to drug warnings that caution 
Recall also that addicts have a propensity to engage in thrill-seeking behavior and to act on 
antisocial impulses. See authorities cited supra, notes 30-31. 
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against use by those with high blood pressure and the like. The anal- 
ogy is weak because this form of disclosure is both pointless and offen- 
sive in connection with addictions. To put on a cigarette package the 
phrase "Do not use if you have a tendency to do rebellious acts that 
ministers condemn" is unlikely to reduce use by antisocial persons; to 
put on liquor labels the phrase "Do not use if you are Irish or poor" 
would be offensive as well as ineffectual. Too little is known about the 
precise personality characteristics and particular group affiliations 
that strongly predict addiction to create helpful and inoffensive "char- 
acter disclosures" for product labels. 
Third, disclosure of the costs of character change are relevant 
because consumers may know that there is a positive probability both 
that a product will hook them because of their characters and that 
they ultimately can escape by changing their characters. A fully 
informed choice to begin consumption would take into account the 
cost of making a later character change. The costs of making a char- 
acter change, however, are primarily mental and emotional, and thus 
both vary considerably across persons and are highly nuanced. A 
product label is an insufficient medium for communicating informa- 
tion of this type. Only education concerning the costs and conse- 
quences of having and altering particular characters will help. 
Fourth, one would want to know what social circumstances conduce 
particularly to addiction. However, warnings against social settings- 
"do not live in an inner city neighborhood"-would not be effective 
when put on product labels (or perhaps on anything). 
In sum, because the product label is the policy clay that deci- 
sionmakers are constrained to shape, they can only fashion some ver- 
sion of the minimal warning. If the CV best explains addictive 
behaviors, no version of this warning should be required. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The question whether firms should be required to warn against the 
addicting properties of products turns on what one believes the pri- 
mary cause of excessive appetitive behavior to be. The two most com- 
mon views of addiction-of the causes of excessive appetitive 
behavior-are that some substances can enslave anyone who uses 
them and that some people's biology strongly predisposes them to 
become enslaved by particular substances. A third and different 
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notion is that some people choose to be addicts because, given their 
characters, substance abuse provides them with pleasures that exceed 
the (often great) pains. These three conceptions are referred to above 
as the strong substance caused view, the biological view, and the 
characterological view. On either of the first two views there is a good 
case for warnings; people should be told that danger exists or at least 
be informed of the odds. The third view will not sustain a case for 
warnings initially because warnings would not influence consumption 
behavior for consumers who hold the characterological view of addic- 
tion. These consumers would know that to try an addictive substance 
would yield positive expected utility whether they ultimately consume 
moderately or to excess; hence, they would try were they warned. To 
fail to warn them thus cannot violate a legal duty. Put another way, if 
consumption yields net expected gains and withdrawal entails incur- 
ring slight physical costs, then ceasing to consume will be difficult 
only because it will entail foregoing positive utility. Warnings against 
opportunity costs of this kind never have been required. For consum- 
ers who hold either of the other two views of addiction, warnings will 
be harmful rather than innocuous; they likely will encourage use by 
those who should abstain, frighten away users who would benefit, and 
discourage addicts from changing their characters. 
Warnings against such commonly abused products as tobacco and 
alcohol should not be required because the evidence shows that the 
characterological view of addiction best explains what is known about 
it. Nor should firms that sell these products without warnings against 
addiction be held liable in tort. These conclusions do not imply that 
the state has no role to play. According to the values most people 
hold, to be addicted is to possess an unfortunate character. It is legiti- 
mate for the state to provide instruction in how characters are formed 
and in the consequences to which the possession of particular charac- 
ters gives rise, and to assist those with few means and a bad habit to 
attempt character change. Also, some addictions that are optimal for 
the addicts are sometimes associated with undesirable behaviors, such 
as ruining family lives or committing crimes, that the civil and crimi- 
nal laws cannot adequately deter. Addicts too are said to make exces- 
sive use of publicly provided health and welfare services. When the 
negative externalities that are associated with a particular substance 
plausibly outweigh the benefits consumption provides to addicts and 
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nonaddicts, there is a prima facie case for banning the substance. In 
sum, the state can respond to the problem of substance abuse with 
good and bad strategies; to require warnings is to choose a bad 
strategy. 
